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traditions! proviiwiiaX ruler*. &m &

of this m m &©*•*

mourn system* aggravated "by the slowness of commmicatton and transports
tlon* the local chieftains, or rases* enjoyed a largo degreo of indepen
dence#

The Iksperor, beading a progressive minority in M s conntry* bad

constantly to contend

a large- reactionary faction which included a

majority of the rases* and border skirmishes not infrequently occurred be
tween wandering1Ethiopian bands and their African neighbors in the adjoin**
in: possessions of European posers#

Slavery* too# althou#i con&ennod by

the geverttsient at Addis Ababa* continued to flourish in outlying districts#
Despite these facts# Ethiopia m s admitted to the League of Hat ions in 19SS#
under the sponsorship of France* supported by Italy#

After that time* in

accordance with pledges made to the League* Haile Selassie increased his
efforts to suppress both slavery and the use of arms by his irresponsible
subjects, and* by 19SS# a considerable iagprcvoMst m s noticeable in them
natters.
Great Britain* France* end Italy all had important economic
interests In Ethiopia*

Foe Great Britain* these interests oentered about

Lako Tsana and the possible construction there of a dam which would in
crease the water supply necessary for %ypt*s summer crops of cotton* sugar*
and rice* and for the agricultural development of the Sudan#

For France#

the main point of emphasis in Ethiopia was the sons surrounding the French
railroad from Jibuti# in French Somaliland# to Addis Ababa — a road which
m s highly profitable to France* since it furnished Ethiopia’s chief outlet
to the sea#

For Italy# the stakes in Ethiopia were perhaps even m o m signi

ficant, since the lands of Haile Selassie* lying directly between the ism
Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland* contained natural resources
which Italy lacked*

In 189S Italy actually attempted to secure domination

of Ethiopia by force of arms* but the Italian attack of that year was *•*»

$

pulaod hv a dloa-strom defeat at-Adeem, find Ethiopia continued to Head its
pgoomriono ea&glMRFtee a#: ari Independent mtet®,
la 1906, Oeent Britain, France, sad Italy concluded a treaty
mproifloally defining- their reqpeettf* ©pherom of i

s

i n Bthiepia
cu
and agreeing on & m a m action In the Ma^Sesa of the- Hegam* In 192S, Italy
a&t&inod from Britain ernsest lo the proposal that. In return for Italian
support of British efforts to m m m m the concession for eonetraetiag a dan
at h&ke f s a m ant a smtor road from the Sudan ^

the dam, Britain would

support Italy*® request for the right to eonetruet and operate a rmllwny

m

menTOsting BTitrea and Italian Saaallland, Amtion tmder this agreement,
howmrer, one draped in July 1926, as a result of French elaliam that the
1906 treaty forhade Snterforeeae© in Ethiopia exaept tgr agreement of mil tlm

m

oi^mtoriea of the treaty, ant of Ethiopian protest to W m j&mgm with reW

gard to a Joint Anglo-Hallon "attesgst to eaoert premmorm,**

France, eiilmh In 1926 m s unfarormijl® toward OSS ©3ETt©I2rSlC32l Of
Italian %

in Ethiopia, shanked Its rlew# mm early as the opting

m m t h of 1936, as a remult of German dmrolepTOiitm which used© Frantso-Italtan
mpproehesaent particularly desirmfcle, da January ¥ of that year, Fronem
and Italy conclwioa the Borne Accord,

tense of this agre^aefit have

i s m Been cos^Xetely dloolomod, hot Its eonelualon apparently mm^md the
Burial of <mt»tsadlng grieraneem Between the tee emmfcriem, end traded
African concessions from France to Italy, In ret o m fur Italy*# promise
(1)

w^ieo^
to, p, 4s¥,
hy Boren, William, «Tr«, ^lisperiallst Siemlriem In Ethiopia,* Foreim
Bmpteafrmr 11, I9SS, p. m *
C D League of Bnticma,.
r, so, t o , u u u
(8) Weolhert, Bofcert S „ "Italy In Ahyswinia," foreign M f M g f b April 196S,
503-6GS,
(4) ftId,, quoted fro® League Boomaemt €?»426,H*161*1926.fII
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to support French policies in the troubled arena of central J&irope*
Sot m l y did international conditions in 1935 incline France to
1Pliancy in Judging Italian projects in Africa, but also the internal prob—
loins with which the government at Paris had to cope at that tire were such
as to dictate a very cautions foreign policy,

Tho country was suffering

from the economic depression v&Ich had run its course earlier in other
sections of the world.

tfc©ff®ployment* which had been alarming to the French

in 1954, m s listed In January 1955 a® 4836 greater than it had been twelve

m

months before.
increasing*

Industrial production m s declining and bankruptcies were

$he index: of stock quotations showed a downward trend*. i*h©

French franc m s feeling the effect of the devaluation of the British pound
and the American dollar*

Discontent was rife in the nation from one end to

the other, and a ran id suecession of ministries reflected tho unstable
political situation*

Sh© Plandin group, which came into power in November ,

1934, failed on Hay SO, 1955 to get a rote of confidence, and m s succeeded
on Hiay 31 by Mi© Boulrson government, which lasted only four days*

Chi

Jtsi© 7, Pierre X*aval formed a ministry* retaining for himself the portfolio
of Foreign Affairs, and this cabinet received a vote of confidence on Jime 8,
althou^x a large heft wing is the Parliament was openly hostile to its poli
cies*

*?bere were whi suers abroad that the French stage was being set for a

m

Fascist dictator, and In tho midst of such economic and political diffi
culties, the

d*Orsagr tended to a ’•safety first*1 policy in foreign af

fairs,
C'bJ For a di©cussIonof the probable terms of this agreement, see Toynbee,
Amoid j „
"itaiy And
Ahrtrafllwi
pp. 103-100.
(8 ) Webb, Horton, "French Business Fights For Normalcy," Current History*,
January 1955, p. 423,
(7) Blots and youth demonstrations, Inspired by Col, de la lioeqe©*s Croix
d© Far anesmt, were the subject of numerous articles at this period.

5

Two factore

have argued for French support of Ethiopia

in the Italo-^thiopian conflict* first, the distasteful prospect of weaken
ing Franeo-British tics; and* second, the danger of dealing a crippling
“blow to the League of nations*

These considerations were counterbalanced,

however, by the peril which Paris believed to be inherent in jeopardising
the nev-'ly achieved Franeo—ItulIan friendship, and by the government*8 un
willingness to undertake any obligations which might intensify the nation’s
economic fears*

All of these factors were viewed by the $ual d’Orsay pri

marily in the light of their bearing upon the German situation and its re
lation to French security*

la this connection, the efficacy of the League

as an instrument of colieetiwe security was tui&oubtedly weakened in the
eyes of the French by the fact that the League confined itself merely to a
declaratory resolution cm the occasion of Hitler’s repudiation of his treaty
(8 )
obligations in the spring of 1935* At the same time the link between Franc®
arid Britain was weakened by the British disposition to accept Hitler’s poll—
(9)

oles and by the conclusion of the Anglo~Gerraan naval treaty in June 1935*
There was ample cause in these developments for a French dtlessm in the
1talo—Sihiopian conflict*

For Great Britain, however, the Italo-Bthioplan controversy
was an instance in which practical considerations of empire and idealistic
support of tixe League system coincided.

Mention has already been made of

(8 ) Hitler’s re-arnarasnt of Germany, announced in March 1935 in defiance of
the Versailles Treaty, resulted only in a League resolution of remoi*straneo.(League of nations, Official Journal. May 1935, pp. 551-552).
(9) Visetelly, Frank H., and associates, The Sew international Tear Book* 1935.
p* 281* **0n June 18 the Belch scored a notable diplomatic triumph by
concluding a naval agreement v/ith Britain, in which Hitler agreed to
limit the proposed German fleet to 39& of British savol tonnage.•***thus
giving official recognition to Germany’s violation of the Versailles
Treaty.*.” This Anglo-German naval agreement aroused deep resentment in
France*

British Interests in lake Tsana,

*59s©*& m e ale© the faot tlmt Great Britain*

with millions of African Hogro subjects, ooul& not fail to view with slams*
any conflict in Scot Hrioa which might ©rouse ffogro subjects in neighboring
provinces'* Thsr© was, ftavthar* the possibility that Italian suoosss in
IJthlopln rai^t challenge British m w i mipromaoy in the ^e&itarrcBGan.

For

those reasons* London m s bound to resist tbs Italian attaint to omaat the
dominions of Bails Selassie,

Prime l&nlster Baldwin, moreover, was s s f t

that pohllo opinion in Britain would ©import a strong stand so the part
his goversomt at Geneva,

1© March 1934, a private enterprise. hnom as the

British Hatlon&I pease Ballot, had been undertaken in England %

the League

of nations Ufcion In collaboration with ether organisations of a sced-publlc
character,

The returns from this ballot, oos^iled in IfSf* and reflecting

the thinkin. ef ©ore them 9P*fjft of the total voting population in Great
Britain and northern Ireland, showed an over^kelraing majority ef votsrs not
only approving Britain’s membership In the League, but also ©©pressing their
belief that tie League should use economic end even a&Sitftsy measures, if
necessary, to compel an aggressor nation to cease its advances against Its
c»>
victim* La view- of this demonstration on the part of the British people, and
In consideration of Britain’s particular interests in the Italo-^3thiopian
affair, the. year 1 ^ 5 was a tine when the British government might cell
wish to cement the bonis of International cooperation and strengthen the
Geneva machinery ftr dealing with cases of military
t y & ’dise^^
''fepcuftait *"rr""r""
L,, ’'The Mntgjgi* For fhs Bile,"*
description of the Pesos Ballot
Toynbee, Arnold J«, op, clt,, v.ll*.

its results is

t

Because of the very definite interests which Britain, France*
and Italy Bad In Bthiopta, and Because, %

the treaty of 1906, these

powers Bad oonialtte& themsolTes to & united front in their BtMoplan
policies* It is clear that an act of aggression against Ethiopia By any
one of the three o u M Bare teen a matter of particular concern for the
other two*

It was proBahly for this reason that the league of nations

looked ©specially to Britain and France for leadership in the settlement
of the Italo-d^thiopian ©entrorcrjsy* But it is ohrioue that, in 1938+ there
were factors which made it hi#*ly lisproB&BX© that Britain and France would
so© eye to eye in the matter of dealing with Italy m mi a^resnor nation
In Africa*

a

Gimp*m II

m m tom&m And m m

a

t

Of m m ltaiw*#t&io$ta& Mapit®,

Blval boriwr patrola of Italy tod ®6Mflg^S* oladtaod on
«*>
5, 1934 at Yaltnl, tat th® jwertnoe of Ogadan, a rteion of graaing loads in

(IS)
the fidBit? of the U M a f t M i haraadaiy line between Ethiopia and Italian
ffiUfT*t;f■Iwarbflt Jjj tfvfrjl

trie* 8®6Ss^Slttl®l listed lid? Mllod did 4&

114)

wnnwftnri g.

the
IIS)
native troop©* £h© incident o&bomad to bar©

arrival la to* dioputod Ofoliml m m

loo®®®*1 i M f ttiwtF
proelpltatod by the

oaa Wmmtom# & # 10&4 of tho Joint

Anslo^dthloplon Conoio&lon for ifc® JQ^UMtatlcm of the Frontier b o t m m
M & e $ i a aki Britisli i m l l J M i o
gftiyy^* of tfo# pewstor©

$hi* ©maaiosAm* in t&* oowoo ©f its

in

®f Qigodosi*

Wm.%!am% M M i i A fev an ISBllSBi bbSSiNi for©©* Jkfior various iuoldoatSn tbi
*mm&w®%m.
mmoart*

w M b tm on

Wmmtmf

£tio M w al

®&, loosing behind It# ifitMopim

tA%&tm®f

to o l plm # on booosfeor a between th is os*

o o rt arid the Ita lia n troops in

mmpm%£m

of ..tte d is tric t*

Other Incidents

tfbllCMNNA* and tho two ^©rorsisants, dJLsgtttis«? tsho o m e M h l p of th© roi^im.

i*s

qiMmtlzm*

M tm lJy

mmmmsk ® m h

©%h©r o f :riN ^m siblM ty»

fte iwaaltins tension botweoa Italy msA Ethiopia w m m m
on &MNMfcor 14 to tho & m g m by m

f # m the Bthiopien I m

o&SP Minister* *sho inforaod the OmrelrasMhsrksrel that tbs A n ^ oM&tl&opdea
MHRAasIon bod bees p m w m t o d % ltalt» stUitaffar f©#rofromooatliiuio^
imrfe, and Umt on j&ao^jer stbo ootort of tbem m s & m k m h&d k 1®

Ito

at»»

taetod ’"without provocation* by Italian tooopo« ^bo Bthiop-ian ^oraro»

YiS0Jl,X iS o ^ V «

S<M»'Sm'"SbT”

(M) ioo aop on ^bo following pa&© few loootleai of m i o ro^<m*
114) loo^ao of fotiooop Official fttffffi Cbmooftor eitod % f L Fob »ltSS#peSSS#

via) ihid* f y# o n *
CM) ib id * , p« m .
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on the contrary, attributed the incident to the "Italian nolie,
7 of gradual
<21)
encroachment ."
The controversy grmr steadily worse ao tho year 1034 drew to a
close.

Ethiopia alleged, that, following the W-alwal Incident, there were

various Italian military operations in the disputed area, while Italy de
nied those assertions.

On January 3, 1935, the Ethiopian govornnent ro*

( 22)

ported "an aggression against the Ethiopian garrison at G-erlogubi," and ro—
(25)
quested the Leagtie, in accordance with Article 11 of the Covenant, to tabs
every measure to safeguard peace*

CQJIEGE Or WiLLIaivi &mt<Y

The League, however* took little direct notice of the Italo—
Ethiopian dispute..

It seems to have expected that the affair would he

settled undar the terns of the Italo—Ethiopian Treaty of 1928, or that
Great Britain and France* as the powers most interested., would ho able to
exert sufficient friendly pressure upon Italy to prevent open aggression.
Throughout the first nine months of 1935, while Ehxssolini rushed rallitaxy
preparations for the African campaign, the League contented itself with the
appointment of successive committees to study various aspects of the situa
tion.
(2l}0p. cit.7 p* 251.
(22 >lbid.# p. 252,
(23)

‘

"Covenant of tho League of Hat ions.
"Article 11
"Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any
of the Mass&sers of the League or cot* is hereby declared a matter of
concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that
may he deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In
case such mi emergency should arise, the Secretapy-General shall, on
the request of any Member of the League, forthwith summon a meeting of
the Council.
"It is also declared to he the friendly right of each Member
of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the
Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations
which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understand
ing between nations upon which peace depends."

m

Accord!jxq to a oorreopondenee filed with the Longoe# Italy and
Ethiopia agreed, in January 1935, to appoint a ooHRdasfton for arbitration
of the ^alwal incident* provided agreement could not first he reached
(24)

through direct negotiations*

In April# Italy reluctantly consented to the

formation of such a eoEsnission* although the Italian government refused to

admit that recourse to the regular diplomatic charnels had teen exhausted*

(2»)

Ethiopia# however. m o eater to see the eorsmisalon constituted# because
Addis Ababa contended that in the matter of direct negotiations Italy had
"proceeded by say of injunctions# w and had further complicated the situation.

(26)

by dispatching troops and war materials to the vicinity of the difficulty*
Pending the contemplated arbitration* the Ethiopian government urged the
league to Investigate these Italian preparations for w ,

Italy- explained

that tb© dispatch of troops to Hast Africa had been req.nlrod for the pro*
tection of Italian colonies in -that region* and that this defensive action
had been dictated by Ethiopians attitude and by the abnormal conditions
i m
still existing on tho frontiers*
The action of the League in the spring of 1955* perhaps due to
the fact tliftt Germany fs denunciation of the Versailles Treaty overshadowed
other matters at Geneva# was limited to a Council resolution of May 25* which
sot a time limit of three months for the settlement of the dispute by arbl~
(28)
tration* The Council m s to meet again on August 25 if by that date no
settlement of the affair had been reached*

Meanwhile* the Council noted that

the two governments were 1b agreement in permitting the arbitrators to settle
sot only the dJ spate over the W&lml incident* but also- other disputes which
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)

O*1'j* SfeWuary 1935* 'pi 162*
0* J* May 1955* p* 57X#
Ibid* * p* 572*
Ibid** p* 575*
0* J* I s s 1955* p* 640*

'
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at Paris and oae-Prosident of the League Assembly. With the aid of
M. Polltis* the corsnission reached, a vnrnitm&i& decision, which was sab—

(30)

nitted to the Council on September 3, 1935, and •which concluded*
w(l) That neither the Italian doveroiaefit nor its agents cm the
spot m m he held responsible in any way for the actual Walwal incident*
the allegations brought against them by the Ethiopian Covernment are dis
proved in particular by the many precautions taken by them to prevent any
incident..* *«
r?(li) That* althsu^h the Ethiopian Cwoverraasnt had no reasonable
Interest in provoking the engagement, its local authorities, by their atti
tude and particularly by the concentration and maintenance, after the de
parture of the .^glo—Ethiopian Commission, of numerous troops in the pro*- ,
imity of the Italian line at Walwal, may have iven the impression that they
hart aggressive Intentions.., .but that nevertheless It had not been Shown
that they can be held responsible for the actual incident of December 5,**
With regard to incidents subsequent to Bsoember 5, the m s m le
sion was ”©f the opinion that, in respect of these minor incidents* no
international responsibility need be Involved***
The report of the arbitration commission did not put an end to
(31)
the Xt&l©-Ethiopian controversy. Ethiopia Charged that throughout the
spring and summer months of 1935 Italy sent to East Africa "troops and
munition•? of war in large quantities, and that it accompaniet; those dis
patches with inflassmtory harangues and speeches full of threats to
Ethiopia*® independence and integrity ,n

Furti^erraore, according to Ethiopian

allegation* Italian newspapers were "constantly publishing reports of fron
tier incidents, with the manifest intention of disturbing relations between
Italy end Ethiopia*”

Os dbsse 20, Ethiopia requested that the Council send

neutral obae-zers at Ethiopia*s expense to inspect the frontier districts*
but ©a this request the Cornell took no action.
Italy* meanwhile, multiplied its accusations and increased its
demands upon Ethiopia,

The kingdom ©f Haile Selassie was now charged with

violating ite treaty obligations* with failing to live up to the promises
30)0. J. Heve&a»©r X93S* p. 1355.
31) 0* J. August 1935. p. 972.

IS

it had mad# when it Joined the League* and with constituting a menace to
neighboring Italian colonies*

In September 1935, at the opening of the

League Connell*s session* Baron Aloioi# the Italian representative* pre
sented a long' and elaborately prepared memorandum on the Ethiopian sitrua—
(32)
tion* fhis document* which reviewed internal conditions iri the African
country with particular emphasis upon slavery, suggested by implication
that the Council should expol Ethiopia from League membership*

Italy,

laoaiiwhlle# reserved the right of "full liberty of action, with the view to
adopting all insures that prove necessary for the security of her colonies '
and for safeguarding her ami interests."
H» Jmoi Ethiopians representative, said that he heard "with
groat surprise the indictment of Ethiopia by the Italian representative,"
and that he wished to "protest most strongly,"

He called attention to ths

fact that, since the Walwal incident had been decided in such a way ao to
exonerate Ethiopia from rerponsiM 11ty for it, this incident could no long
er furnish a basis for Italian action*
tinuing*

Bmh. action, nevertheless, w s con

B© urged the Council to esrmine the situation rdthout delay,

since the question was "whether in a few days a’war of eactormlnatlaa will
(33)
be opened."
During the month of August preceding the Council session in which
the Italian rmmrandxm m m presented, tri-partit© discussions with. regard
to the Xtalo—Ethiopian controversy had token place in Paris betr.eon the representativoo of Great Britain* Prance, and Italy.

A report of this Hire#

Power Conference was mode to the Cornell by Mr. Anthony Eden* the British
representative* on September 4 / the mstm day on which Baron Aloici pro(32) 0. J. Horerfcer 1935, pp. 1347-1416.
(35 ) Ibid., p. U39.

m

sentod his indictment of Ethiopia.

Cm )
From *%, Sdon’s report it m s evident

that no solution to the &1 spate had. “been reached*

It appeared that the

Italian delegate at the Paris conference, after having stated a number of
complaints against Ethiopia, liad laid sepcial emphasis upon the political
and economic interests of his eountry in Ethiopia, and had stated that no
agreement could he reached unless thes© Interests w r e properly considered.
'The delegates from Britain and Franco, attempting to tafeo into consideration
the Italian claims, had drm m up a program of reorganisation to he effected
in Ethiopia with the assistance of an international, eonalsslon. and had &r*»
ranged for particular concessions to Italy under the reorganised regime in
Ethiopia; hut the proposed, reforms had. been rejected by the Italian govertfe**
men t.

It w

evident to the League Council that negotiations for a

peaceful settlement of the 11aio-Ethlopian differences had failed. There**
fore# acting on the request of Ethlonla that the Council m k e the neces(85)

oary decisions for fulfilling Its "mission under Article 15# paragraph 5#** ,
the President proposed on Septotfber $ that a Com!ttoe of Fire he appointed
to make a general abomination of Ital0-*EthIoptcm relations.

Sudh a com-*

xaittwe m s appointed, V-e members including the representatives of Britain*
France, Poland, Spain, and Turkey.
'(34) Op.cit., pp. 1135-113'’.
(35) Ibid.» p. 1138,
♦*0 ovenant of the League of Hations
"Article 15
Paragraph $
stPhe Comoll shall endeavor to effect a settlement of the die*
nut© and, if such efforts are successful, a state:.-eat shall he made
public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and
the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate*"

Thin O m m ltbee of Five reported to the Council on September 26
that they have made suggestions to Italy and Ethiopia which vmre similar
In character to those made by the Anglo—Preneh delegates at the Three Power
Conference in Paris,

Ones moire international assistance to Sthiopla, this

time as a recommendation of the Committee of Five, was suggested as a solu*
tion vdildh might be acceptable to both, parties*

fh® Independence and ter«*

ritorial integrity of Ethiopia would be respected; Italy, however, would
be given the opportunity to resume relations with Ethiopia In security
upon a basis of understanding and collaboration.

Tim governments of Fran**

and Britain agreed to recognise a special Italian interest in the economic
development of Ethiopia* and ft

intimated also that these two powers

would facilitate, by cammm sacrifices* territorial adjustments between
Italy end Ethiopia,
(56)
fhasse suggestions of the Committee of Five were accepted, by
Ethiopia as a basis of no utlatlon* but were rejected by Italy on the fact
that no attention had been m i d by the committee to Italian charges that
Ethiopia, by reason of her fail're to meet treaty obligations and fulfill
pprdsee made to the League regardtng- slavery, m s tsnrartby of considers**
tion on a basis of equality with other Iieague members*

Italy* in summary*

felt "obliged to demonstrate the Impossibility of any agreement, eve®
economic, with Ethiopia, in view of that country*# ineaimcity to aittr into*
(57)
and still less to respect* international agreements of any kind whatever,*
On receiving this information, the Council entrusted to a
committoe consisting of all the mfcers of the Council except the party
involved (the Committee of thirteen) the task of drafting* a report with
(361 iaaSSa Seteammt C .4U(l) JI.2G7<l).1935.m. pp. 16-20.
(37) Ibid., pp. 20-21 .
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(m }
regard to the application of Article 15, paragraph 4, of the Covenant.
The Consulttee of Five remained in existence, h o m e r , for the purpose of
Judging whether a further attempt at conciliation night he justifiable*
In other words, although the first step had "been taken in a coercive
program, the Cornell ves careful not to close the door of conciliation
©gainst Italy.
On October g, three days before the Committee of 'Thirteen
m ade

its report, Mussolini addressed 20*000,000 Italians In a speech that

m s "broadcast thr<mghout the world, The losynote of this address was the
"irresistible" destiny of Italy and the complete loss of Italian patience
with Ethiopia.

The day after this speech, Italian troops invaded flails

Selassie’s empire from the north, east, and smith.

The *Var of exterral—

nation** had begun, despite the fact that when the- Fascist legion a marched
into Ethiopia 7,fnssolini m m violating four treaties to which Italy was a
signatory* the Covenant of the league of Fattens, the Keliogy—Byland Pea©#
Fact, the Italo—Sthlopi&n Treaty of Amity of 1928, mnd the Treaty of 1906
"between Britain.^ France, and Italy with regard to their Ethiopian Interests*
It m s 1b mn stesspher© of great international concern, there
fore, that the Committee of Thirteen delivered its report at Gensv* on

(m)
October 5*

This report reviewed the history of the Italc—®thl opian con

troversy and reached the conclusion that* while Incidents had occurred
(38)

" '
" n '"" lf*0crv^^ant""of"^tW'^ague of F&tiorifi■|,rrT"rr "■|,,,^_n

**A rticle 15
Paragraph 4
f,lf the dispute is not thus settled, the Council, either
unanimously or by a majority vote, shall make and rubbish a report
con tainin a statement of the facts of the dispute and bhe recom
mendations which are docraed Just and proper la regard thereto.*’
(39) league Document C .411(1).M.2C?(l).1935.ill, pp. 14-15.

If

from tiim to tirao along Ethiopia* s frontiers, they mare not in the nature
of agression by Ethiopia, and had never “been hrmi iit to the attention of
the Council by any one of the states which had neighboring territories in
Africa*

It m s further pointed out that the states in 1923 which had

supported Ethiopians cnn&ldacy for admission to the League, of which states
Italy was admittedly one# had lootown at the time of internal conditions in
Ethiopia and that these conditions since then had improved rather thar
deteriorated#

The committee also pointed out that in the present contro

versy Ethiopia had sought a peaceful set Memcnt froa the beginning, that it
had requested hea-'-ie co-operation in its domestic reorganization, and that
it had accepted' the proposals of the Committee of Five*

Italy, cm the otbar

hand, had, rejected all proposals for a peaceful settlement of the affair*
Following the report of the Cocamittee of Thirteen, the Presi
dent of the Cornell stated that "in view of' the important statements we
have just heard and of the serious facts that have been brought to cror
notice*" he proposed to appoint a Costalttee of Six* vdiose merfbers were to
(40)

enable the Council to "hake decisions with a Tull knowledge of the facts."
His proposal was adopted, and th© Committee of Sir woo Formed, Its makers
including the representatives of Britain, Chile* Benmark* France, Portugal*;

and Iiumanla*
^he Committee of Six reported or. October 7 that it had "come (41)

to tli© conclusion that tho ttallnn Govemnor t has resorted to war In
’(doV O. J. Horanfcar 19SS, p. 121S.
(41) IMd., p. 1S25.

m

Chapter III — -'Phe League Applies Sanctions.
r
PLv League Assembly met on October 9, 1935*
verdict of the Council that Italy had ’’resorted to w

At this time the
indisre gard

of its

covenants" was presented to the body of nations for approval* Members

of

the Assembly ’
who oppose the Council decision were asked to speaks silence
t?ould he interpreted as assent to the indictment of Italy-.

Tba representap*

tives of three nations* Albania* Austria, and Hungary* spoke in Italy’s be
half*

With the exception of these countries* all the states* fifty-on© in

number* concurred* by their silence, in the finding of the Council.

Italy

thereupon became subject to the penalties which might be imposed inder
( 44 r)

Article 16 of the Covenant of the League*
{44}

~~~

"Covenant of the' X*eagiie of Hiatlons
• • A r t ic l e 1 6

"Should any Hn&er of the League resort to war in disregard of
its covenants under Articles 1£* 13* or 15, it shall logo facto be
deemed to have committed m act of war against all other Members of th©
Zieague* which hereby undertake immediately to subject it- to the sever
ance of all trad© or financial relations, the prohibition of all inter
course between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant—breafe*
lag State, and th© prevention of all financial* ccoMrcl&l* or personal
intercourse between th© nationals of the covenant—'breaking; State and
the nationals of any other State* whether a Member of the League or not.
"It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend
to th© several Crovemraents concerned what effective military* naval or
air force the Monjbers of the League shall severally contribute to th©
armed forces to b© used to protect the covenants of the League*
"The Meribere of the League agree, further* that they will nEitttally support one another in the financial and economic measures which
are taken tinder this Article* in order to minimis© the loss and incon
venience resulting from th© above measures, and that they will mutually
support (me another in resisting any special measures aimed at on© of
tlieir nusfcer by the eovenant—breaking State, and that they will take the
necessary stops to afford passage through their territory to the forcesof any of th© Members of the League which are co-operating to protect
the covenants of the League*
"Any limber of the League which has violated any covenant of
th© League may be declared to b© no longer a Member of the League by a
vote of th© Council concurred in by th© Bepreoontat Ives of all th© other
Members of the League represented thereon."
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To recommend to the individual nations suitable measures to
be taken under Article 16, a Co—©rdlnation Committee, composed of one deles-*
gate from each of the League states essscept th© two nations at war, was set
by the Assesnhly*

2his committee, at its first meeting, on October 11*

1955, elected as its chairman Senhor do Yaseoncollos, of Portugal, and then
appointed a "little Co-ordination Comr&ttQo" to do th© actual work of draft
ing sanctions*

2h© "Little Co-ordination Committee" afterward known as the

Committee of Eighteen* included, in addition to Chairman Vasconcellos jgg
officio> on© representative from each of the following states: Britain*
France, Canada, the Union of South Africa* Argentina, Belgium* Greece, th©
Netherlands, Poland, T&nraania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 2tgrkey, the U.S*S.B.,
and iSasdeo*
On October 11, the Committee of Eighteen proposed an embargo on
(48)

all arms shipments to Italy* including in this proposal the lifting of all
restrictions previously adopted by League members ©n arms shipments to
Ethiopia*

On October 14* a measure to ban loans and the extension of credit
<46)

to Italy was voted, and on October 19* three other proposals wore adopted*
2b© first of these, sponsored by Groat Britain, prohibited Importation by
League members of all goodscoming directly

or indirectly from Italy— a

measure which* it m s estimated, would cutoff

70^ ofItalian©aborts
and
i m
deprive Italy of its principal source of foreign currency. The second pro
posal, supported by France, placed an embargo on the shipment to Italy of
(40)
all raw materials essential for war purposes* It was expoctod that this
action would further reduce Italy1s chance of purchasing war materials
(45)" 0* J*' Special" Supplement ho *' ISO, "Bfoposals And Rosolutios Of 2h©
Co-ordination Cornedtte© And 2h© Committee of Bi^iteen", p* 2*
(4$) Ibid.* p. 4*
(47) Ibid., p. 6 ,
(43) Ibid., p. 9*

abroad, but cotton* copper, petroleum, and the finished products of iron
and rubber were not designated among the prohibited purchases*

Scnor do

Sh&ariaga, the Spanish delegate, called attention to those incongruities*
but the French and British delegates explained that only products controlled
by modbors of 'fee League had been included in fee list* and that, therefore*
Iron ore and raw rubber had been included, but that th© finished products of .
these commodities* because they were not controlled by league members, had
not been included.

2h@ propose was accepted as it stood*

The third pro

posal adopted mi October 19 was a pledge of mutual assistance by League mean*
bers to minimi m

the economic losses which would be suffered by the nations

as a result of applying sanctions against Italy*

tfeder this measure th®

signatories agreed to try to replace imports from Italy wife imports from tbs
states which would suffer most from fee loss of fee Italian market, states
such as Humania end Yugoslavia, In particular,

Purthermoro, League members

would practice discrimination against countries such as Albania, Austria, and
Hungary, which stood to profit by their refusal to apply sanctions against
Italy*
2heso reconfnendat ion3 of the Committee of Eighteen were trans—

(81)
oitted to the individual governments for their approval and comments* and th®
sanctions did not go into effect mtll November is*

One reason for the daisy*

apparently* m s fee fact that peace negotiations were being secretly carried
on between Borne* Paris* and London,

Reports of such negotiations were de

nied at fee time, but it seems that they did take place* on the basis of a
peace plan produced at Paris by a i'ranco-Britlah. pair of experts,

IpSy a,'"'yVspTOial
Ho*1'145*"""pp* 79—80,
(50) 0. «T. Special Supplement Ho* ISO* p* 11*
(51) Ibid.* fee entire document.

M* de St* Quentin and Hr* Peterson* Ho agreement m s reached throu^pi this
moans* however* and eventually the nations were obliged to proceed with
sanctions*
Meanwhile* from October SI to November 6 * tbs Co-ordination
Committee held its second session*

This purpose of this session was to

examine the replies of individual countries with regard to their reception
of tlie reooxaasndad sanctions.

In the process of this examination fee very

interesting developraent3 appeared* the question of th© famous "mandate** to
France and Britain and tlie question of extending the sanctio ns to include
petroie\sa*
It « s the Prim© Minister of Belgium* M* van Eeeland* who pro
posed to the Co-ordination Comaltte© that Britain and France should actually
be given a "mandate* to effect a settlement between Italy and Ethiopia* Bald
<ss)
M* van Eeelands
"Sine© fee responsible leaders of two great countries have al~
ready devoted a large part of their time and their talents to this task*
why should not th© League entrust to them the mission of seeking, under Its
auspices and control and in the spirit of th© Covenant, tlie elements of a
solution which tlie three parties at issue — th© League* Italy* and Ethiopia —
might find it possible to accept?"
Since the Polish delegate pointed out that the Council m s "tbs
(52) Dean* Vera' illchela's, "The siest For Ethiopian Peace," Foreign Policy
Reports* February 26* 1956, pp. 318-519*
"It would appear*.... .that on October 16 Sl^ior Cerruti*
Italian Anibassador in Paris* gave M* Laval th© outline of a
settlement acceptable to Mussolini, and that the French Prim©
Minister conveyed this information to the British Government*,**
KassoliniTs proposals ^ore examined in Paris by Hr. Kaurie©
Peterson, head of th© Abyssinian department of th© British
Foreign Office, and his French colle&lrue, M* de St. Quentin.
Townboe, Amold J.. amnr*y Of International Affair.. 1955. v.II, p. 2821
"...*A rumour that M* Laval, at a meeting with the British
Ambassador,.*had comminicated to M m some Italian peace tetme* **
was officially denied.*, The Paris correspondent of The Bai.lv Herald
reported that..**M* d© St, dentin and Mr* Peterson had produced in
Paris a peace plan*...."
(53) 0 . J* Special Supplement Ho* 146, p* 9,
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(54)
only body competent to deal with tlie substance of the problem*” th© Belgian
proposal m s not put to a vote, and no formal mandate m s conferred by th©
Co-ordination Committee, 'The Chairman of the Committee did state, however,
that ’’the menfbers note the hope expressed by the first delegate of Belgium

(55)
and give it their full approval,"

This Incident was to give rise to the

Hoare-haval negotiations which wore to be an important chapter i..i later
dovelopments.
The proposal to extend the- League embargo against Italy to
petroleum earns from theCanadian delegate, Mr*Riddell*
suggested that thesanctions

who, onNovember

beenlarged tocover“petroleum

(56)

atives, coal, iron, cast iron, and steel,"

2,

and itsderive

It may bo assumed that this

action of the representatlvo from Canada was a source of embarrassment not

tm
only to &ome of th© other committee members, but also to M s own government*
Hevertheles s, his proposal, referred by the CtaBsnittoe of Eighteen to the
Bccmomlc Sub-Ccminittee, and by them to a drafting committee, was finally
adopted as "Proposal Ho, 4A", and was included In the circular letter of

(58)
ITovember 7 which wont out from th© S©crotary~£eneral to tho various stats#*
Ysd'y 0 p# cit, , p 7 I i 7 r r_r"r'Tr "n"1"1 *■rr"T,i"r,"in'
nTn'i
'"i,|",rti11 r'
imrtiri rr,"“'
1*",r™"t
i
(55) Ibid,, p, IE,
(56) Ibid,, p. 58,
(57) Teyabes, Arnold J*, op, clt., v.II, p, 2741
”0n the 1st of December the Canadian Acting Premier,
Mr, Lapointe, declared that Mr* Riddell’s proposal merely repre—
sonted his personal opinion and that the Canadian Government had
not tah®» th© initiative in any such action, A few days later It
was announced that Mr. Riddell would not continue to serve on the
Committee of Eighteen as he had been appointed a delegate to th©
Pan-American Labour- Conference at Santiago da Chile, This belated
disavowal of Mr, Riddell aroused considerable opposition in
Canada, ••
(58) 0* 3* Special Supplement No. 150,, p* 10,

m

In tlie two developments outlined above, the possibility of1
a "mandat#** to Britain and France to effect an Italo-Ethiopimx peace and
th© possibility of an. oil sanction against Italy* th© appearance of two
divergent trends in League policy is to be noted*

If the mandate idea

were pursued* a bargain with Italy was likely to be arranged In Mi© inters
©sto of Buropean peace at th© ©aspens© of a small nation.

If the oil

sanction were pursued* th© war with Ethiopia was likely to be hrou£$it t©
an end at tz*# price of Italy* s hostility to th® L m & m states* Kither
policy might, in the end, prove to be worth th© price# but both policies
con Id not be effectively followed at th© same time,

^his was a fact which

most have been evident to th® statesmen at Geneva* but it seem® to have
been ignored*

Instead of choosing between two ©oars®® of action* the Le&gs®

embarked upon both.
From th# very beginning this paradoxical attitude of th© League
proved to be of immense advantage to the Italians. While the statesmen
argued# th© Fascist troop® pushed more deeply into Ethiopia.

The advance

of General d© Bono* th® Italian m m m n d m r in northern Ethiopia* was almost
uninterrupted during th© first six weeks of the conflict*

On October 6 his

troops captured Idem* the scene of the Italian disaster of 1890* and css
October IS the Holy City of -tosm surrendered to his army without struggle.
Following tlie fall of these psychologically important points* General de
Bon© was replaced in the Italian cosmand* on Bovemher 16, by Iforshal
Badoglio.

'fb&re m s perhaps a studied ourming in this appointment# since

ISsrshal Badoglio* s reputation as a soldier was well-known in Boyope* and
(59)
was a natter of particular respect on the part of th© French* With Mils
general in command * the Italian advance was likely to bo even nor© rapid
Ts9) ¥oynbeo,” AjSold d,* op* eit., v, II, p£90*
.in th© opinion of
the French General Staff* Badoglio was the best soldier alive in Burope."

troop© in Scrjttom
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M* Laval, acting under pressure from Italy, appears to have
(63)
■begun a caspoifp for Oofouting the oil sanction in Hoverabor 1935. At tliat
tine there m s a furore in th© Italian press on th© subject of the possible
petroleum embargo, and there were rumors that Si^ior 0em.it! * Italian
Ambassador at Paris, had informed Id* Laval that such an embargo would pr©~
<64)
cipitate a crisis, perhaps a Suropean t o t . At th© same tiro© there wore
referoneos in Borne to troop movements, the inference being that I.oissolini
(55)
would re-fcrtify the Alps on the French border* It was at this juncture
that Senhor do V&scaneellos announced, on November 22, -that th© Committee
of Bightaea would meet on Hoveraber 29 to discuss the replies received fro®
the various nations regarding Proposal Ho* 4A,

Irss©&iately II* Laval

bogged a postponement of th© meting, explaining that parliamentary engage-**
(66)
meats in Paris would Tsafee his attendance impossible on the date tuinounced*
Accordingly, Senhor do Vasconoellos set Beoember 12 as the date for the
conveaing of the Committee of Eighteen,
On Hoverdber 30, certain members of the Committee of Eighteen
were informed verbally at Geneva by Signor Born Scuppa, Secretary of the
Italian delegation, that adoption of Proposal Ho* 4A would be considered by
(67)
the Italian government as *’aa unfriendly act.n
On 1‘ecember 7, Sir Samuel Hoare* in poor health and bound for a
vacation, stopped in Paris for a brief conversation with K, Laval*

Phis com**

vorsation resulted in the IIoare—Laval Plan, lust what preceded this deal Is
uncertain, but it seems probable that M* Laval told Sir Samuel that Si^aor
Cerruti had intimated an Italian attack upon th© British fleet in the
(60 ) 1’oynbee,

64)
(65)
S 66I
67)

Arnold J „ op, eit*, p* 277*
Bean, Vera Micheles* op* eit., p« 2126 and p, 624*
Ibid*, p, 624.
Toynbee, Arnold J*» op, eit*, p* 278 and p. 278,
Ibid,, p, « * » ’
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(68)
Mediterranean* if the oil sanction v/oro adopted• It seems also probable
that It. Laval added that, in such an event* there -weald be sorao uncertainty
of -trench support for Britain*

At any* rate* Sir Samuel was obviously

frightened into signing a proposition Tdsich amounted to handing over to
Italy about half of Ethiopia*

I'Ms arrangonjent* based upon plans made

Cst)
earlier "by i.l. de St* guentin and Mr* Peterson* m s proposed in two parts*
called TlitBchange of territory” and "hone of Economic Esqon-sion and Settle—
ment."

She first part would permit Italy to annex all the territory in

northern. Ethiopia which had been conquero ’ by Italian military forces*
e:;ccpt the city of Axorru

In return* Italy would, cede to Ethiopia a tiny

strip of Eritrea as an outlet to the sea*

She second part of the agreement

applied to Southern Ethiopia* and provided for extensive concessions to
Italy In a son© not yet conquered by force of arms.
!
Ph©s© suggestions were completed in Paris on December 8* and
transmitted to London by Mr* Peterson*

Sir Samuel continued on hi a way to

a holiday in Switzerland* apparently confident that M s activities would

(TO)
remain secret until they vmre examined by the British government*

As a

matter of fact* however* French newspapers on the very next morning carried
detailed accounts of the bargain* so that Mr* Peterson and tlie publicized
version arrived at approximately the same time on Doming Street* Immedi
ately a storm of adverse criticism brohse upon the two authors of the plan.
Since M. Laval was his own Prime Minister* he had the situation somewhat
better in hand than Iiis uafortunato colleague* Sir Saasuel, who was the object
of bitter criticism in the House of Cessaons* Eventually Sir Samuel was
eacrificad to public opinion and was succeeded in the office of Foreign
(68) Toynbee,' Arnold

(69) Ibid** pp. 295-300*
(70) Ibid.* p. 301*
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S e c r e t a r y b y Mr* B d o n .

M. ■L o r a l te m p o r a r ily o u tr o d e t lie sto r m in F ra n ce*

The Committee

Sixteen met, as scheduled, on December 12,

hut, it may he assumed, in an atmo sphere or confusion, because vd th the
results of the Hoare-*Laml Plan still vnlmomi, continued d!sc- ssion of
Proposal No. 44 was rendered pointless.

Pending the outcome of the plan*

which had been common1eated only the day before to the two belligerents and
to the Secretary-General of the League, it m a proposed that all further
consideration of the oil sanction he deferred*
therefore adjourned on December IS.

The Committee of -Eighteen

Prance was successful, at least for

the time he in/?, in warding off a really stringent measure against Italy*
Ethiopia, not imnat~irally, did not agree to the Hoaxx>—Laval
(71)
Plan* Mussolini, haring hept quiet until ^ecembor 18, on. that day made It
clear that he, too, scorned the plan which had. already been refused "by his
(m)
adversary and repudiated by public opinion in "both Britain and France.
On December 19, the League Council adopted a resolution instructing the
(7S>
Committee of Thirteen to examine the Italo-Fthiopian situation as a whole.
This committee temporarily superseded the Committee of Eighteen in import
ance,

There remained nothing for the Committee of -Eighteen to do, except*

as Chairman de Vaseoncellos rermrhed to his colleagues on December 1C, wto
follow the application of the sanctions in force and...to remain in touch
with the Chairmen of the Coraraltt'e of Thirteen with regard to the next
(74)
meet in : of the Committee of Bl^teon*"
Amid this multiplicity of committees, tlie oil sanction was lost,
and J®nesolini#s troops continued to advance while Genova did nothing*
(71)
(72)
(7SJ
(74)

0. J.January"1956, pp. 41—42.
Toynbee* Arnold J«, op, eit*. v. II* p, $12.
0 . J.January 1956.
p. 14*
0. d*Special Supplement Ho, 147, p. 11,
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Or January 20, 1936, the Cossaittoe of Thirteeu mot to discuss
the Italo-Ethiopian affair for th© first time sine© -December 19*

At this

time a report m s dram up, submitted to the Council on January £3, and
adopted by that body in the presence of, but without the concurrence of,
(7D)
the Italian representative* This report began with th© words, "The war I®
continuing in Ethiopian territory,** but proposed nothing to be done about
the situation*

Instead, it went on to explain that the Ethiopian request

for financial assistance could not be complied with because the Convention
for Financial Assistance to which the Ethiopian gov@mu.ent referred had sot
yet com© into operation* that the Ethiopian request for a committee of in
quiry at the scene of the conflict wee passed over because of an Ethiopian
statement of January 20 to th© effect that such an inquiry now appeared to
the government to- be "of less value” j and that the Committee of Thirteen
could only "decide to watch the situation carefully, in accordance with the
mandate which it received from the Council on December 19*”

Only one con

clusion of Importance could be drawn from this report, and that was the fact
that th© Committee of Thirteen evidently considered- it useless to recommend
further attempt® at conciliation,
The Committee of Sixteen therefore resumed its efforts in the
(76)
direction of coercion of Italy* On January 22 this contaitteo decided "to
create a Committee of Sferperts to sendeet a technical examination of the eon—
ditlons governing tlie trade In and transport of petroleum and its derivatives,
by—products and residues, with a view to submitting an early report to the
Consaitt.ee of Sixteen on the effectiveness of the extension of measures of
embargo to the above-mentioned commodities,** and it requested it® chairman
1(75)"" 0 * '

J *
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(76) 0. J, Special Supplement No* 148, p* 9,
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’

wto invite certain Governments to appoint experts to servo on a committee
for* this purpose*” ‘
The Cossaittec of Mxperts was duly constituted, with represeutatives designated lay the governments of Britain, Franco9 lran, Iraq,Mexico, th© ^otherlarias, ttorwoy» Peru, Itoaaia, Sweden, and

tlie U*S*S*V:,

tfadar the charirnanahip of 11. Gomez, of Mexico, the Committee of
Imports met February 3 —

and produced a report whose salient features
(77)
may he summarized as follows :

1, Under conditions prevailing at 'the time, it would require a
period of about three months for an oil embargo to be effective against Italy*
£, Such an embargo would be ineffective if it were applied only
by the members of the League, but if tit© Halted States of America would limit
its exports to Italy to th© normal level of such exports prior to 1935, the
embargo would be effective,
3* In view of the possible use by Italy of substitutes for pe
troleumproducts, the embargo would be strengthened if It were extended t©
©over industrial alcohol and benzol*
4* To be effective, an embargo on transport would have to extend
to th©tankers of all nations, not Just those owned by League members, and
attention would have to be directed toward the prevention of traffic by in—
direct rentes*
This report was presetted to the Committee of eighteen at its
next meeting, on March 2, but before th© committee could consider the appli
cation of Proposal Ho* 44, the French delegate, M* Hand in, had a suggest ion
to uj&ke.

mTh© French delegation thought it would be desirable for the

Committee of thirteen to meet again and consider if it would not be possible
(78)

to make another urgent appeal to the belligerentsto

put an end

Th© French proposal was accepted, thusstaving off the
sanction for another interim*

to the war,"
oil

The Committee of Thirteen, on March 3, ad—

dressed to the belligerents wan urgent appeal for the immediate opening of
negotiations within the framework of the League***.with a view to the prompt
(79)
cessation of hostilities and the definite restoration of peace*” Th© cos*
*(77) 0« J*""Special duppiemont Hoi, 148, p. 67*
! 78) 0 * *7* Special Supplement So* 149, p, 13*
79} 0. J. April 1936, Fart II, p, 359,

mittee m s to meet on March 10 to hear replies from th® belligerents*
la the meantime* Germany* on Ife,reh 7* reoecupied the demlli**
tarised zone In the 3h£neland* and th© Ethiopian affair was side-tracked
In the minds of both French and British statesmen.

The Committee of rhir—

teen reassembled* not on March 10* but cm March 23* in London* where the
Council was holding an extraordinary session to deal with th© German
problem.
Both Italy and

thlopia replied encouragingly to the March 3

appeal of the Coonitftse of fMitess to bring their hostilities to a close*
There appears to hare been some doubt* however* of Italian sincerity on
(SO)
this ?>oint, because, although Italy*© reply of March 8 indicated 1,
1 Tmep*&
(SI)
acceptance **in principle” of the committee's apical* vfchlopia complained
that the Italians had not declared th© terms under which they would negoti
ate "within the framework of the League*” fhe Ethiopian commonication
gave notice that Haile Selassie's acceptable© of the committee*s request
had been contingent upon Italy’s fulfillment of this stipulation, which*
mm Ethiopia pointed out* had been laid down by the committee itself*

The

Ethiopian not© went on to remind th©
League that ”for fifteen months rast”
sthe African country had "made pressing appeals for the League's inter
vention,” and that* so far* "no effective solution” had h e m forthcoming*
In conclusion* th© Ethiopians urged that ”the assistance ’remised undor

Article 16” be given to their stricken county "without delay and with
all necessary effectiveness.”
Wbon the Committee of Thirteen mot on March 23, however, th©
question of sanctions was not raised, and iSthlopi- #s request that Italy
loby 0 . J. April 1936, Part II* p* 395*
(81) Ibid.* p. 396.

~
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be required to give m m m ass ranee of acceptance of the committee*©
stipulations of March $ was passed over.

The Committee of Thirteen con
fab}
fined itself to the passage of this resolution*
"Th® Cotaraitte© of thirteen take® note of the replies given by
the two parties to the dispute to- the appeal addressed to- the® on March 5.
It requests its Chairman* assisted by the Secretary-General* to get in
touch with the two parties and to take such steps as may be called for In
order that th® Committee may be able* as -soon as possible* to bring- th®
two parties together and* within th® framework of th© League of lotions and
in the spirit of th® Covenant* to bring about the prompt cessation of
hostilities and the restoration of peace.”
On April 6 * foil® Selassie*® forces were defeated by Marshal
Ba&oglio in th® Battle of lake Ashangi* and on April f th® League received
(83)
from Ethiopia an appeal containing the following sentences
"Does collective security consist only in making platonie pro—
test against the aggressor and in addressing words of compassion to its
victim?”
Tim Committee of Thirteen met. at British Insistence* on
April 8 * On this occasion* Mr. JMon spoke strongly both on th® delay of th©
League in handling the Italo-Ethiopl&n problem and on the us© of poison gas
by the Italians.

She latter subject was side-tracked by M. Flandin's ob

jection that th© CoKEfiitteo of thirteen was not a body competent to deal with
the question of atrocities* and that* moreover* Italian charges against th©
Ethiopians in the matter of mutilation of prisoners must be given equal
consideration with the Ethiopian charges against the Italians with regard to
the use of poison gas.

Finally an especially appointed consoltte© of Jurists

ruled that the Cornell of the League warn competent to deal with any treaty
violations and that the Connell eould delegate its power to such organs as
It might see fit.

The Committee of Thirteen then addresed to both belll&»

M ^ bp;cit.; i>art II* p. 398. r”rr
(83) Ibid.* p. 401.
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©rents a eontmmlcation asking them ”to take all measures necessary to pre
vent any failure to observe the Conventions or th© principles of inter—
(04)
national law#”
To this anpeal the Ethiopian government* on April 11* gave
assurance that it would take all steps necessary to suppress illegal modes
of warfare, hut the Italian government assorted that "The observance of
these laws must he bilateral*

The Italian military authorities cannot do
(OS)
otherwise than punish every human atrocity committed by its adversary,”
Brer since th© London meeting of the CoaraltteG of Thirteen#

Chairman do Madariaga had been attempting to carry cut his instructions
”to get in touch with the two parties” by having a conversation with the
Italian representative.

This had proven a difficult task in both London

and Geneva} the Italian government had insisted that Senor de Madariaga
come to Bees© for M s discussion,

Eventually# although the Italians still

preferred to have the conversations in Boras# Baron Alois! consented to see
Senor d© Madariaga in Geneva on April 15,

As a result of this interview*

(86)

the following Italian demands wore reported to the Committee of Thirteen!
”1, With reference to the Italian Governmentrs telegram of
March 8 tk# 1936, tlie Italian delegation informs the Chairman of the Cos**
mittee of Thirteen that its Government definitely agrees to the immediate
opening of negotiations with a view to th© cessation of hostilities. The
cessation may be the outcome of the signature either of an armistice or of
preliminaries of peace.«•.••
Being anxious to emphasise the Italian Government’s desire
to respond as effectively as possible to the invitation of the Committee of
Thirteen# the Italian delegation accordingly pronounces in favour of.,,.,
preliminaries of peace.
”11. The Italian delegation fools bound to point out that such
negotiations could not be based on any situation other than th© actual
situation as it presents Itself after six months of military operations#
In taking Its stand on the ground of conciliation* th© Committee of Thirteen
T»*T Op* cit. , Part XI, p* 363#
(85) Ibid., p. 363.
(86 ) Ibid., p. 361,
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no doubt agrees that there is a da facto situation.
The Italian delegation dose not ask the Committee of
Thirteen to recognise that situation, hut merely not to ignore it*
”■111. For these reasons» the Italian delegation ©oneiders that
the only method suited to that situation is th© method of direct negotia
tions* It is prepared to consider any means of enabling the Committee of
thirteen to be kept informed of the negotiations*
It would suggest that the venue of the negotiations should
be fixed at Ouehy.
nlV. Th® Italian delegation takes this opportunity to express
its hope that the outcome of .these negotiations will be such as to enable
the Italian Government to resume active participation with the league of
Rations In consonance with the general situation*
These proposals were rejected by Mi® Ethiopian delegation when
communicated to thorn.
<87)
rejection*

This significant comment was included in their

**In asking that the Ethiopian people be abandoned to its ag
gressor* the Italian Govemrient I® in reality merely fixing its price for
a bargain * whereby Italy would give her support in a European dispute in
return for the removal of sanctions and for the League's indifference to
the Italian aggression.”
Cbi April 17, B&nor d® Madariaga reported to the Committee of
Thirteen the failure of the tmdertakinu with which he had been entrusted
on March 25*

On April 20 this failure was re-iterated in the report of the

Comal tte© of Thirteen to the Council.
The meeting of the Council at ‘
>i«n©va on April 20 is interest
ing, because, coining as it did on the eve of Haile Selassie*s flight from
hie country and of the abrupt denouement of the whole Italo-Ethlopiaa
story, it revealed so clearly the positions which had been taken by the
nations of the league*
The first speaker, after the report of the Committee of
Thirteen, was Baron Alois!, who, adopting an aggrieved tone, laid th®
(87) Op. clt„. Part II, p. 361.
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blame for the failure of the peace negotiations upon Ethiopia*® unwillingness to co-operate and "most definitely” rejected "the insinuation. •..that
the Italian Government was tiering to drive a bargain for its support in a
European dispute*”

Tk&n, as thon^ substantiating this very insinuation*

he concluded wi^i the remark that "Italian co-operation in the work of
European pacification# which will have to follow the settlement of th©
Italo—Gthiopian dispute,
(88)
cone iliatlon

..will also he retarded by the failure of

Mr* Eden* who followed Baron Alois! as a speaker, voiced a
last-minute appeal for the strengthening of sanctions and a nice for the
(89)
future of the League* M. Paul-Boncoiir, speaking for Franco, did not echo
Mr* Bdea*s concern with the future*

He was occupied with th© present a d

with "considerations of elementary prudence,** v&ich apparently meant the
(90)
conciliation of Italy at any price,
M* Potemkin©* of th© U.S*S,B«* expressed himself as being
"distressed to so© that even within th© League itself there is a tendency
to tro t an aggressor with more tolerance find even indulgence the moro ar—
(tl)
rogant he shows himself to bo.”
Inhere were other speakers.

Inclining to the British view of

strengthening sanctions were M* Borberg, of Denmark* Mr, Bruce* of
Australia* and Sen or Buis Gunlamt, of Argentina.

Senhor do V&sGoncellos*

of Portugal* Joined with Mr. Eden in his denunciation of th© us© of poison
gas. But Senor Garcia Old ini, of Chile* and Sonor Baldumbide, of Ecuador*
felt* with M, Paul-Boncour# that it was a time for conciliation,
(as)
(89)
(90)
(91)

o* . oit„ Hurt ii, p. sn".
Ibid., p. 379,
Ibid., pp. 379-360.
Ibid., p. 380.
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Gtt April 20, th© Cornell passed a resolution taking not© of th®
(92)
various reports which hud feeen. submitted to it, -and continuing as follows*
n(fh© Cornell) Begrets that.,.it has not been possible to bring
about th© cessation of hostilities and that war is continuing tinder condi
tions which have been declared to b© contrary to the Covenant, and which
Involve th© execution of the obligations laid upon th© Member© of th© league
In such a ease by the Covenant i
"Addresses to Italy a supreme appeal that, in view of present
circumstances, which call for the co-operation of all th© nations, she
should bring to the settlement of her dispute with Ethiopia that spirit
which th© League of Nations is entitled to expect from one of its original
lumbers and a permanent ISsftsr of th# Councilf
wHecalls that Italy and Ethiopia are bound by th© Protocols of
June17th, 1925, on the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and
by th© Conventions regarding the conduct of war to which these two States
are parties, and ©emphasises the importance which has been attached to these
instruments by all th# contracting States.”
Following th# adoption of this resolution, th# Council adjourned
to meet ©gala on May 11 #
Meanwhile, th© Italian armies in Ethiopia won their victory*
On May 2th© Smperor, with his family and M s suit#, fled from Ethiopia*
On May 5 Italian troops occupied Addis Ababa, and th© ©vent was hailed by
Mssaolinl not only as the end of th© Italo-Ethiopian war, but also as the
(95)
end of th© sovereign state of Ethiopia* On Mfiy 9 XI Buff# announced a de
er## annexing Ethiopia to Italy and conferring th© title of "Emperor” upon
th® King of Italy,

By another deoree, Marehal Badoglio was appointed

Severnor-General of Ethiopia*

Ihese decrees were converted into la’ by

acts of th© Italian Chamber and Senate cm May 14 and May 16*
!
2tm League Council, meeting cm May 11, was therefore presented
with a fait accompli in th© Italian conquest of Ethiopia*

On May 12 , in

the absence of Baron Alois! (th© Italian delegation having been
Borne that morning), but with M, Woldo Maryan

recalled to

still representingEthiopiaat

(925 Op* cit*, Part II, p. S9S*
(93) 1?Gynh©#, Arnold J*, op* cit*, v* II, p* 358.

m

(94)
th© Council table, th© Connell adopted the following resolution*
°The Council,
?*Haviag met to consider the dispute hetween Italy and Ethiopia*
"Ifcoalls the conclusions reached and the decisions taken in •
this matter in the League of Hattons since October 3rd, 1935$
”Is of the opinion that further time Is necessary to permit its
Hesabers to consider the situation created by the grave new steps taken by
th© Italian Government;
^Becidee to resume its delitem tions on this subject on
June loth;
”And considers that*, in the fsaemtime* there is no cause for
Modifying tlie measures previously adopted in collaborati on by th© Members
cf the League,”
Actually* it was the Assembly* meeting on June 30, which wound
up the Ethiopian affair,

Italy sent to the Assembly a letter describing the

Situation in Ethiopia, with particular emphasis upon the beneficial remits
of Italy’s work in that country and the still more beneficial results to

(9S>
come,

’
-This letter, signed by Count Ciano, closed with an offer of Italy’s

European co—operation in exchange for the lifting of sanctions*
”Uhe Italian Government cannot but recall the abnormal situs**
tion in which Italy has boon placed and the necessity for the immediate re
moval of such obstacles as have been and aro In the way of the international
co—operation which Italy sincerely seeks, and to v&iich she is prepared to
give a tangible contribution for the sake of the maintenance of peace,”
Tim reading of the Italian letter was followed by a speech
from the delegate of Argentina, whose government had requested th© summon
ing of the Assembly, ®h© purpose of this address was to outline th© Mease
(96)
of consciencef4 with which th© League was faced,
As the representative from Argentina completed his remarks,
(97)
Haile Selassie in person rose to state the Ethiopian case. Said the Bogus*
”®h©r© is perhaps no precedent for a head of a state himself
spooking in this Assembly* But there is certainly no precedent for a people
being th© victim of such wrongs and being threatened with abandonment to
(94)
(95)
(96)
(97)

0, J.June 1936, p. 54<h
0 * J, Special Supplement Bo, 151, pp. 19-21.

Ibid,, pp, 21—22.
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its aggressor* Her has there ever before been an eas-mpl© of any Govern
ment proceeding to th© systematic ecxterminat1on of © nation by barbarous
means in violation of the most soleum promisee***,*”
He went on to review the whole controversy, stressing the
frightfulness of the Italian onslaught .and the delay of th© diplomatic
procedure by whieh the members of the leagao had promised assistance that
was not forthcoming*

He made the point that he was ^defending the cause

of all small peoples who are threatened with aggression” and proclaimed
that th© question at hand involved **the very ealsbenee of the league**
In the succeeding days of th© Assembly session there wore other
speakers from other countries*

f
£he French delegate re-iterated the usual

French thesis of the necessity, first and foremost* for European security*
Th& representatives of Britain and its dominions all deplored the failure
of the league to uphold the Covenant,

M, I&tvinov, of the U*S.S,H*# wont

to the heart of th© affair under discussion, beginning his remarks as
(96)
follows*
"W© have met here to complete a page in the history of the
league of Nations, a page in the history of international life which it
will be impossible for us to read without a feeling of bitterness. We
have to liquidate a course of action which m s began in fulfillment of
our obligations as Member© of the league,,. *. .but which was not carried
to Its conclusion.* ***”
On July' 2# the Ethiopian delegation submitted to th© Presi—
(99)
dent two draft resolutions, read to th© Assembly as follows*
"I* Tha Assembly recalls the terms of Articles 10 and 10 of
the Covenant, to which it declares its faithful adherence* Accordingly,
it proclaims that it will recognise no annexation obtained by force*
”11* Tho Assembly# desirous of affording Ethiopia the assis
tance to which Article 16 entitles it, in order that it may defend its
territorial integrity and political independence, decides to recommend to
the Government* of the States Members to give their guarantee to th© loan
(98} Op* cit., p* 35 *
(99j Xbld*, pm 60*
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of 10 ,000*000 pounds which will be issued by Ethiopia under oon&iticaa# to
be fixed by the Council after an opinion has boon given by the Financial
Committee of th© League of Mations,"
These resolutions, however* were not immediately voted upon by
the League*

Instead, the followin

draft resolution, submitted by the
(£00 )
General Committee of the League, m s given priority*
"I

HTh@ Assembly,
”(l) Saving met again on th© initiative of th© Government, of
the Argentine Bepublic, and in pursuance of th© decision to adjourn its
session taken on October 11th, 1955, in order to examine the situation
arising out of the Italo—ISthiopian dispute#
n{2 ) Talcing note of the comzunicationo and declarations which
have been made to it on this subject $
**(5) Mating that various circumstances have prevented the full
application of th© Covenant of th© league of Mations*
"(4 ) '©maining firmly attached to th© principles of th©
Covenant, which are also expressed in other diplomatic instruments such as
the declaration of th© American' States, dated August 3rd* 1952, excluding
th© settlement of territorial questions by force?
"(5) Being desirous of strengthening the authority of the league
of Hations by adapting the application of these principles to the.lessons r
of experience j
”(6 ) Being convinced that it is necessary to strengthen the real
effectiveness of Mi# guarantees of security which the League affords to its
Members *
"Jbseasaeiids that th© Councils
"(a) Should invite th# Governments of the *lembers of the League
to send to the Secretary-General, so far as possible before Septenftior 1st.,
1956, any proposals they may wish to make in order to improve, in the
spirit or within the limits laid d o w above, the application of the
principles of th© Covenant#
"(b) Should instruct the S©cretary—General to melas a first
examination and classification of those proposals?
"(c) Should report to the Assembly at Its next meeting on the
state of the question,
"II
"The Assembly,
"Taking note of the eonimmlcations and declarations which have
bee’ made to it on the subject of the situation arising out of the Italo-*
Ethiopian dispute!
"Bscalling the previous finding and decisions in connection
with this dispute*
"Becommends that the Co-ordination Committoo should make all

boo)

0 . J, Special Supplement Me, 151, pp. 65—66,

necessary proposals to the Geverancmts in order to "bring to an end the
measures tafcen by them In eaceeution of Article 16 of the Covenant.”
When this resolution of th® General Committee was put to a
vote. Ethiopia voted against it* four states abstained fror* voting, and
<101)
fortjrwfotur states voted In favor of it. M. van Soeland, the President of
the Assembly* t4um turned his attrition to th© Ethiopian resolutions*

lb®

first of these, he pointed out, was covered by the General Couraitto©*©
resolution.

On the second, the Ethiopian request for financial assistance.

ixm)
th® Assembly voted as follows*
In favor
«
■■■
Against
■»iiim,
Abstentions -*■ — .»■-n..— —

•...,, %
— -wr,
zz
........... ... 25

The Ethiopian cause was lost., and th© League Assembly closed its
session on July 4, 1936. with President van Zeeland*© final address include

(xm)
trig the following words*
”1 do not consider that all th© criticisms — however
understandable — which have been by implication brought against us &r©
deserved....*. 1 believe that those amangst us who have acte.’ in this
way can, even after what has taken place* claim that their conscience is
clear j the;/ have contributed to th© work which we are here attempting to
promote, everything which it was in their power to give....**

It remained only for tbs delegates at Geneva to resolve them*
selves into the Co-ordination Committee and to reeomaertd that sanctions
against Italy be lifted.

This was don© cm July 4* with July 15 set as the
C104}
date on which the sanctions should cease to apply.
Italy*© victory was complete.

^lOl)
(102)
(103)
(104)
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demonstrated tbs ineffeativeness of Qsnem's n^achinery for collective se—
C108)
cufity* 2rl©r to Gerrsan;y*n tost case, XI Pmm* although apparently delib
erately prolonging the negotiations over the WalwaX incident,, professed a
friendly spirit toward Ethiopia and a willingness to settle amicably the
differences between Boras end Addis Ababa*

After the Carman estample, h©^*-

ever, the Italian grievances against the empire of tbs Begn® were speedily
permitted to Justify military operations*
The Italian government# began Its campaign with efforts, in
the early months of the Italo-Kthlopion controversy, to secure a settlement
of the Walwal Incident by strictly hi lateral negotiations between the two
government® Involved*

This was a legally tenable position under the pro

vision® of the Treaty of 1928, Article 5 ©f which Ethiopia invoked*
(109)
article readsv

This

"Both Governments undertake to submit to a procedure of con
ciliation and arbitration disputes which any arise between them and which
it may not have been possible to settle by ordinary diplomatic methods,
without having recourse to armed force***,"
When Ethiopia, urged that the WalwaX incident ho submitted to
"a procedure of conciliation and arbitration,n Italy argued that "ordinary
diplomatic methods" had not been ©achausted*

For Instance, In the

cation from the Italian government to the Secretary-General of the League
(110)
on March Z2, 1935, the following passages appear*
MIt is untrue that the Ethiopian Government vainly demanded
arbitration* The Italian Government has* •,oontimiod its endeavours to ar
rive at a settlement ©f the incident In accordance with, the provision® of
Article 5 of the Treaty of 1928, both by official correspondence and by
"The Italian Government, although not considering, for its
part, the phase of direct negotiations to be at an end, and althowh still
(StJSj Xnilarchl9S5# Germany annomeed'' itsr€M^rrf«m©nt itedefliaise of "lb®1
Versailles Treaty* The League*m only action at this time was a reso
lution ©f remonstrance*

(109) 0. J. June 19SS, p. 639,
(HO) 0, a* May 193S* p, 673,

m

a reply from Ethiopia, deelares, nevertheless, that it has not,
m d has never had# any intention of evading the procedure laid down in
Article 5 of the treaty of* 1928* In conformity with the provisions of
this article* the Italian Government is, on its side, prepared, if the
phase of direct negotiations closes without an agreement feeing reached# and
if the Ethiopian Government does the saute, to tales steps forthwith with a
view to the constitution of the commission provided for* In such circum
stances , the Italian Government points out that# the dispute in question
being one which the two Governments forced by the exchange of notes of
January 19th last to submit to the procedure laid down, in Article 5 of the
treaty of 1928, Article IS of the Covenant cannot be applicable in this par
ticular ease,**
(ill)
Again, on B^r S5, 19SS, Baron Alois! told the Council that*
"fhe test of the 1928 treaty and the letters which form an
integral part of it provide in the clearest possible terras for three succes
sive phases of procedures direct negotiations, scneiHation, arbitration*
w19ie first phase began jtavaediately in January and oontinuad un
til the time vhen the Ethiopian Govormient ashed that the direct negotiations,
which, nevertheless, had never been Interrupted, should be regarded as ex
hausted. l*he Italian Government, anxious to show condescension and goodwill,
acceded to the Ethiopian request*.*♦”
■Shis bit of strategy on Italy*s part, which, technically, could
sot be assailed, served to tie the hands of the league from January until
June,
In the second phase of the conflict, when Ethiopia’s repeated
demands that the case be laid before an arbitration eonsisslon finally
forced Italy to agree to the formation of such a corralssion, p. Puce*g representa11ves were promptly ready with a second stalemate*

SShis time- they

sou^it to limit tb© competence of any arbitration commission to a decision
on the actual fitting at Walwal, exclusive of the question of the disputed
ownership of the territory.

Baron Alois! laid the foundation for this

manoeuver on May 25, 19155, when, In accepting Ethiopia’s request for an
(112 )
arbitration ocwdseten* he told the league Council*
nXt must be recalled that the Italo-Ethiopisn X'reaty of 1908
concerning the frontiers between Somaliland and Ethiopia leys down in
Article 5 that the two Governments undertake to fix the frontier line on
the spot in accordance with the particulars mentioned in the treaty,
(ill) 0. jr. Jtma 1935, p. 641.
(US) Ibid.

46

"In application of this article* an Italo—Ethiopian Commission
’went to woric la 1910* but after deaa:smtiag the frontier in the Bolo son*. 1%
w&® obliged to suspend work***.*
wIt is to this Boundary Conaaission that falls, if need be, the
task of interpreting the prowl sions of the 190^ Treaty m d settling any cog
nate questions*
Italian Government, which has quite recently confirmed to
the Ethiopian (krrannaent its readiness to continue the demarcation of the fron**
tier as soon as the preset dispute has been settled, cannot agree to any pro**
cedure other than that stipulated in the 1908 ‘
Treaty**..*
"Similarly, the Italian Government cannot, for obvious reasons of
prestige, agree to the resumption forthwith of the work of demarcation,....*
On JtOy 8« 1935. Count A1dromui and M. Montagna followed Baron
Aloisi’s lead by registering a prompt objection to the examination by the
arbitration commission of the question oi the ownership of Walwal, which they

(US)
characterised as “a frontier question," svslnded from examination by the

cobw*

(114)

mission.

11. do X»a Pradelle and Mr* Better argued that*

^The correctness of the conduct of the officer conrmndirig the
Italian line, as record zed by him, and argued by the diplomatic represcatat 1ve
of Italy, was, it Is clear, intimately hound up from the first day with the
determination of the Italian or Ethiopian nationality of ^MweX.,."
Bat the league ruling on the competence of the commission sustained the
(115)
Italian objection* Italy thus succeeded in rendering the report of the east*
mission practically worthless.
By the time the arbitration commission was ready to submit the
unlllumin ting conclusion that neither Italy nor Ethiopia was to blame for the
Walwal incident* Italy was ready to furnish new excuses for the attack on
Ethiopia.

Baron Alois! accordingly presented the league, m

the opening dey

of Its session in Sepbes&er 1935, with a long and carefully prepared memoran
dum on the domestic situation in Ethiopia.
(115)
two ports, with subheads as followsi

This document was divided into

Bart 1. Italy And Ethiopia.
I, Violations of Italo-Sthlopian treaties by Ethiopia.

(ilS) 0. J, A'ugmrt 1985. p. WS.

'.......

{1X4) Xbid>i
994.
(US) IMd.. p. 968.
{116) 0. J. M n eto r 1935. pp. 1355-1416.
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a solo perforamme by II 3>uce. who consistently refused to participate in
any Jointly administered system of .Ethiopian reform. even thou^i such a eye-'
tom might contemplate particular economic advantages for Italy.
Afbar nine iramths of skillful parleying, Jgas&oiini was un
coverins; M s do®l&is,

Italy was 'bent on war,

hike all wars, it was to be,

acoordlng to Italian representtat1on, a 'defense measure,

It m m further de

signed to lift from their backwardness a barbaric people, against whom, it
was apparent, II Buea had been making warlike preparation® for all the
month® In vftiidh he had ke*pt the hand® of the hoaga© tied.
Was £t Italy*® bland assumption that such a venture would be
allowed to proceed unchallenged to its inevitable conclusion?
been.

It insy h&v©

Certainly the Sino-Japanese affair offered an excellent precedent

for concluding that League action would be a fiasco; and the existing
European situation, with Great Britian and France still measy over the
German Phoenix, argued strongly for non-intervention by the '-'©stem Powers
In Italy1*® colonial projects.

If llaeeoXini*# thoughts, however, were that

the legality of M s action would pas® unquestioned * he was doomed to disap
pointment*

The Im&ggm not only indicted Italy for aggression, but also

moved with, amusing promptness to draft sanction® against th© aggressor.
This put 11 Pace in a difficult position, but he accepted the
the challenge.

Proclaiming to the ^orld that tlm Imgus was using two
fm)
weights and two measures for Judging nations, Italy staunchly affirmed that
(122)
sanction® would not alter her course. Said Mussolini in a public address*
"For months past, the wheel of Destiny ha® been moving towards
Its goal under the impulsion of our calm determinationf at the present hour
it® rhythm is more swift mid irresistible than ever... To economic sanctions
T{lt3££5""qT“3 *"April '19S6," ,
i>e3rt
Barm' Aloisi’a spi^oh t© Coia^ii'tl',~
•'.♦...for Italy ihere were two weight® and two measures.**
(122) l&soolini*s speech of October 2. 1935; quoted by Toynbee, ^a-nold Jj,
©p* ©It., v* IX, p. 200 ,
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not now wlthdrmv from Ethiopia **+..because of the peoples who have placed
their faith in us and who would he dedicated, to terrible reprisals and re
venge should Italian protection eoxne to tan end."

FtErJharmore, continued

1.1 Xfoco in. sterner tone, the resort to sanctions, "far from facilitating the

termination of the conflict,.*.♦adds to Its gravity and threatens to prolong
its duration*"

In add!tie®, Italy would bo obliged to seek ways of defend

ing Itself throu^x "economic and financial measures" which

involve

"substantial deviations fro© present currents of exchange and trade,"
If this- net© were Intended to split the league membero into- opposing factions, it Aid not succeed,

Selther did it further delay the appli

cation of sanctions, which went into effect, as scheduled, on Hoverober 16,
(IZ7)
In Italy, as recounted by Vera Micheles Been, the Fascist Council voted*
"to consider lfove.iiber 18...as #a date of i&ioznlny and iniquity
in Hi© history of the world* f,„, invited all Italians to hang cut flags as
if It were a holiday? ordered a stone record of the *stg@** to be sculptured
on the buildings of all Italian c o n m m e s a n d expressed its sympathy to
those states fdxlch, by refusing to apply sanctions, had ’aided the cans® of
peace,’"
As Huesoliai foretold, Italy immediately applied counter sane-*
tions as a retaliation.

Special licenses were required for the importation

of 19? specified commodities, including many articles not yet on the league’s
embargo list, fro© countries applying sanctions against Italy.

Puce also

took steps to conserve the nation’s resources. Stringent measures were an
nounced to regulate the use and purchase of important articles of national
defease,

Gold was sought in every corner of the realm, and the world was

treated to a series of propaganda pictures showing Italian women donating
their ve&ding rings to be made into bullion for governmental use,
Tim problem which most worried
Vera MelilesT'opr cit,, p,' S2lT ~

Pace apparently was not the

wk ctforfc to fonastal1 the development*

Ee also aa&t if knees* that an^r at~>
(ISO)
tempt to Interfere aitfe Italy*® oil napply seald be aoftsl&erad an set of w *
fbli threat aaay have been cm aet or desperation*

mmmalint*

heavily eeasBitted to the Ethiopian renters by imreetmenta of «ttrs variety*
laelndlng taasn Ilf© and the Xt&Xisn national pnere* m m M . not withdrew
froia Africa oe Soto in the gene*

HO zanst have been fairly c m “tala* memo**

over* that* Sf bo bloatered ©neo^* bo w m M , got awey with it,

Fr&rs©#*

faced always ty the Gcmtm problem* ehieh booms© siore aomte in Heret* 193$
when Haai troops marohod into the deaaillbarlsod Hhlnel&nd* eottld not af»
ford the ageetaele of on evor^powored Italy*

In addition, it took no diplo

matic seer to divino that what Surop© wanted least of oil m m a Suarcpeaa
Oxioo a o i e WaamoXlni mmSM o u t w it b i o fo© »*

>• <1* Spooi&l 9app&MN»-t Bo. ISO* p* AO.
i* Arnold #*, so* ©it*# ir» 11* p. 29ft
*i* sarly oo the 24$& (EoroEsfeer) It m m m lng rumored In Paris that
m* ZOT&l bad heest Infonaod by the Italian Ara&asoador, Signor Cerruti#
that an cactoneion of the oi^ar o.***to inoXu&o oil ml. ;bt bo e^pootod
to have an tnioward offset upon Italo-Frerioh relations<»
p* 20* Also Toynbee. op* cll.t f* 11» p. «*«*»»
artioie is £« bo1o fl*Italto. Feb. 1» 1986, »aid to bo by H— altwlt
”At a certain m m m % + the embargo will end in a blockade; sod the
blocked© fill asean oar - mo longer a 1 M M operation of colonial
security. bat a m r of oxtermination in

1 M I -m O osom asat s M m m t o small m m t i t s attiMte
tbm I*©a^n® of S&itaR8» tesplt© m m w m m s m m irspsood for ttis first tis*
Hjr tfc*
States spaa Xia^* m s €£sas?astse>is®& t@r it© t^Mliignsae to ta&s
all laAtlatlses lots ftooroJbis 'Str«t4tescitiaEi««*.**«
"Stas a t t s s p t s m d s %s t h i s oa& &r© « e l i Tmmm* U 20 H o ro p ter® !
fommrdmi to Qmtmm* M m ® m n I a MIs M a t s mi Emmk&sp Hits* 1^355*
^ P M m w s t m o a&out t® svxiliia witti M s ipsatoet attention*
t o w r s j t s t o i. % M s Bsgm
**Qn mrefc 3P&* M§S* M s Cocaaitto© of
$eai to M s partlas at Ismi© to attest s ^ E & M s n * On Xtertib
itn&Sas Qommmmm.% replied % issXarteg its
to ns$sfcleit®»
M s «$»pso3t o f M s OM M fttise c f f?tolFiean m il IW m igta** M s fatanM o f 13
M e Italian troops loei no Initiative is isiSifei^ operations* it a s M s
Massif ito# at M s % o(0mimg. of April* sanest M s troop® la M s battle
Sfllrtlo prQSPOS €wP»3LS*ve-*.*»**•♦.*
%
tb$
o f ©omforsatiorris M M at
on April M M anA
X©tfc witli M s ^mMmam *f M s Gsoslttoe of fMrtssa* attended ts ths Soerst&ryOwsr&l of M s Imagim* ^ reppsssritatlt'a of f s Stallan {fcwsrnnoni defined
Mm mmm®? in sfeidfti n e g o tia tio n s mmsM, Ise aw& ostadL****
”0n April M M * M o BMlopioa. Q& m m s m nt a^sirt implied ^Ltb m
.* In t t o s o s lie s n s ta a o s a * m m SSeaasIX d ecid ed * o s A p ril SQb 19^d*

m

not only did he lack support, but that Im m s menaced, by the rising popo*
lation as well as by the wvlflfa he had mobilised* Baring the retreat from
Bessie, this ©prising cost tlia lives of several members or the Imperil es
cort*
f’Before the Italian troops reached Addis Ababa* the ridim®tary
©rgonic^bian of the Htdoplcn State lad collapsed* The capital or Stidopla
bad been deliberately left o p ® to looters and Incendiaries* so that ■Italian
Intervention was urged to protest the Foreign Legations. Italy found the
country in a state of the meet fearful disorder* On few occasions in Ms-*
tory has the collapse of a regime and a dynasty received sixeh a clear,and
definite sanction by its own hand and by the will of the popMatlaa as in the
present case*
nItaly was therefore courpolled to accept such respons1 M 1itles
as were entailed by the situation and t©***coiaply with the wishes and require
ments of the peculations obviously needful of a new order capable of assuring
progress and peace**.*
f M s rersarkable letter wont on to describe Italy*© "sacred mis—
s i ® of civilisation*’ and the laaasfirea already taken In Bthiepia to carry cut
the mission*

It was documented with a list of flic chieftains who had already

pledged their allegiance to Italy* with fh© royal decree defining the orgsni—
nation and adninlsfration of ’’Italian Seat Africa"* and with Barstml
proclamation* as Governor of the newly acquired territory* outlawing s3

(W?)

Tim letter closed, a© lies been previously noted* closed with mi invitation to
raise the sanctions Irnsdi&teXyv ms that Italy ml#tt demonstrot© Its willing—
ness to co-operate with the League states "for the sals© and maintenance” of
peace.

country, living eeecoplished its own belligerent designs*

was now ready to give "a tangible contribution” to the realisation of this

Tba

sanctions wore lifted on dbly 13* 1956, and, at least as far

as the de facto situation went, Italy emerged entirely free with the Bthiopiaa
prise*

as for tbe dp, lur^ situation* we mey assume that Mussolini was not

greatly concerned!
lISS)

Op* ©it** pp.* 99—104*
,157) See p* 59.

m

Chapter Y - Ethiopia As fits Victim.
It was Mkiopia which confided the Italo-Ethioplsn controversy
to Geneva*

In a telegram to the Secretary-General on December 14, 1955,
(158)
the W d m l incident was reported as follows by Addis Ababa t
"Imperial Government has the honor to Inform yon, for eommuni—
nation to the Council and States Members, that, on November 25r& last, AngloAbyssinian Commission investigating pasture-laads in the Abyssinian province
©f Ogaden was prevented by Italian military force from continning its work
upon its arrival at W&Iwal, situated about 100 klIos»&l©rs within the frontier*
On December Sth Italian troops with tanks and. military aeroplanes suddenly
and without provocation attacked Abyssinian escort of the Cofamission* Abys
sinian Government protested by note of Decembor 8th* Bespit© protest,
Italian military aeroplanes three days labor bombarded Ado and Gcrlogofel In.
the same province. In response to protest of December 6th and request for
arbitration of December 9th tinder Article 5 of Ital©~Ahyssiziian frosty of
August 2nd, 1908, Italian Charge d #Affaires, dlsr©gar&ing protest, demanded
indemnity end moral reparation in n >be of Beoembor 11th and declared in note
of December 14th that his government doos not see how the solution of an in
cident of this character oan be submitted to arbitral decision* In presence
of Itillan aggression Abyssinian Govstnsittfct draws Council*© attention to
gravity of situation. Detailed confirmation and documents follow*"
<£he detailed confirmation and documents" followed, as promised,
in the for® of a long memorandiHa presetted to the Secretary-General of the
Deagn# cm January 15*

Calling attention to the fact that Ethiopia was exer

cising Its "friendly right", under Article 11 of the Covenant, "to bring to
the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever
affecting international relations which threatens to disturb International
(159)
peace or the good understanding between nations," this memorandum stated the

Ethiopian version Of the facts, reviewed the diplomatic negotiations which
had followed, quoted frtm treaties between Italy and Ethiopia to establish
the Ethiopian nationality of Walwal, and concluded with the Ethiopian con
tention that the dispute was essentially capable of arbltr tion as eontera(140)
plated fey Article 5 of the Italo-Afeyusinion "ftroaty of Atigoat Z, 1928, and
(138) 0. J. February 1935, p. 274.
(139) See p, 11.
(140) See p. 44.

m

{*41.)
Article IS of the t e g w Covenant#

Appended to the Ethiopian mmmrrnidxm -ms

the correspondence vdticli took place at V'alwal between hleuten&rit-Colonel
£* H* M. Clifford, British Cossraissionor, and Captain Hoherto GSmmmt&m# the
(Ma)
officer eossaandino the Italian line* Th& tone of this correspondence Is in
teresting,

fhe British officer warn apparently as Indignant as the Ethiopian©

over the Italian action, which hath British and Ethiopians considered an im—

(14$)
warranted Invasion of Ethiopian terrlte^.

^he language of the Italian of—
(144)

floor was also considered objec11on&ble By the British officer,
dl41) ’

r"J"

^"’^oveajant 'of 'the League of S ^ i ^ S r ™ ' ^ "
’,""n™
"Article IS
"Members of the League agree that, whenever an? dispute shall
arise beteen them which the? recognise to he suitable for submission to ar
bitration nod which cannot be sati©factor!ly settled by diplomacy, they will
sutait the whole matter to arbitration,
"disputes as to the interpretatIon of a treat?, as to mi? ques
tion of international law, as to the existence of an? fast which if estab
lished would constitute a breach of an? international obligation, or as to
the extent and nature of the reparation to made for any such broach, are de
clared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to ar
bitration,
"For the eousi&erstlon of any such dispute the court of arbitra
tion to which the case Is referred Shall be the court agreed on by the par
ties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.
"the Members of the League agree that they will carry out in
fall good faith any award that sa@y be rendered and that they will act resort
to war against a Manner of the League which complies therewith. In the
event of any failure to carry out such an award, the Council shall propose
what steps should be taken to give effect thereto,"
{142} 0, J» February 193ft, pp. 256—262.
(143) Ibid,, p. 261 j Lieut .-Col, Clifford to Capt. Clmaruta*
Italop-Abyesiaian Convention, -wlgpaA on Hay 16th, 1908,
stipulates that the whole of the Ogaden territory shall rernain an Abyssinian
dependency. As the Comfciaslon*© terms of reference in that region merely
concern the Ogadan territory.... .there has never been any question of the
Ceisialssloa*© entering Italian territory,..,.”
(144) Ibid., p. 262| Lieut .-Col. Clifford to Cap*. Clsw&ratat
”WS Should like to believe that you do not know the meaning of
the word *£hefb&* — an expression which is not used in this way in an inter
national cojwsunleation.” (Capt. Ctaa&ruta had referred in writing to the
commander of the Abyssinia escort of the eoxrmiosion as a "Chief Shefta” "bandit chief",)
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ttofortunately, the Justification of British and Ethiopian
indignation on this occasion m s n e w permitted to to® established* sine©
the decision of the arbitration comraisqion m m limited to the actual mili
tary clash. at W&lwal, which took place after the British officer had with*
d r a m hi® commission to Ado*

Tim represent&tires of Ethiopia on th© arbi

tration commission, although over-ruled toy the League's ruling on the com
petence of the arbitrators* did# however, mate out a strosng case for the
admission of the question of the ownership of Walwal to the discussions of
the responsibility Involved in the military clash,
{145}
followsi

2?heir argument ran aa

’’Whereas, in fudging of the responsibility for an engagement
Between foreign and national troops* it is not a matter of indifference to
establish which were national and which were foreign osx the actual seme of
tli® engagementf whereas*.******** moreover, the circumstances include, not
only factual circumstances, tout also legal circumstances* ****•? whereas,
furthermore, this point of view cannot toe regarded as forcing* to the factual
cireumstances of the incident, which include the circumstances that on
December 4th# 1934, the day before the incident, the officer commanding the
Italian line# Captain Chasaaruta, wrote t fJ[ shall to® .Obliged to regard at^y
act of violence,... .jag.afeagSgd. M O W f !
J3it fflLS
■&£■
King of Italy, * and# secondly# that* on Beeenter 11th* 1934, if* Mombolli,
Italian Charge d'Affaires at Addis Ababa* w o t ® to E* S* Blaten Gh®ta Horny,
Minister for Foreigti Affaires *(1) Iter® can toe no doubt that Walwal and
Warder belong to Italian Somaliland, as the Italian Government will show in
do© course; (2) Consequently, Captain Cinisarut&'s conduct m e qulto correct,f
so that the correctness of the conduct of the officer commanding the Italian
line, as recognised toy him and argued toy the diplomatic representative of
Italy* was, it is clear, intimately bound up from the first day with the de
termination of the Italian or Ethiopian nationality of Walwal, not to say
conditioned toy that determination j.........
"For these reasons*,*,*,
"(fbe undersigned Arbitrators) decide,
^itet It would too an abdication of the Comaiscion's independence
and a restriction upon th® liberty of the defence to forbid the agont of the
Ethiopian Government to state the reasons which lead him to consider that the
Commission, being free to Judge of all the cir<narastancos of the incident, may
include among those circumstances the *ownership* ©f Walwal ,*T
(Signed) A, de la Prsdelle*
(Signed) Pitman B, Fetter*
(145) 0. JV August i935, p* ^74.

H&gped
It vas by two outstanding students of international
(146)
law* this report could scarcely have failed to ingress the statesmen at
Geneva with its logical reasoning and Its possible legal correctness.

The

trouble was that Ethiopia was unable to back up its legal case with force
of arms, and in the disturbed condition of Europe in 1930 it was fruitless
to hope that a champion of Ethiopia would appear among the Great Posers*
The Ethiopians seem to have known, almost from the beginning*
that they were faced with the prospect of a war for shieh they were ill
prepared*

They chose to meet this threat with a demonstration of peaceful

Intentions and with a reliance upon Geneva to clear up the problem*

Thus

the remarks of if* J©&©, the Ethiopian representative* to the Council on
duly 51# 1955* at the time of the Council's consideration of the competence
(147)
■of the arbitration commission to decide the ownership of W&lwalt
"The Ethiopian Government wished to inform the Council of the
circumstances in which the arbitral procedure* for which it had pressed
from the outset*****had some to a standstill. The time has ©sms# if the
Council sc desires* for the Ethiopian Ck*v®rnm©nt t© supply a full explana
tion on this subject* but possibly for the moment it rai^it be more desir
able to note, in tho first place* that the Ethiopian Government has appealed
to the League in, order that this problem, ^hieh has been before it ©in©#
January 1930* may be settled finally* the problem. at issue being to prevent
a war, and* further* that the Ethiopian Governiaent is determined to do all
It ©an t© reach a peaceful ^oluti<feb*1*
ly September 1935* the pli^it of Ethiopia was i^re desiderate*
At the Council meeting of Septaofecr 4* d d e h witnessed three new develop
ments in the situation — the report of the arbitration commission* the re
port of the failure of the ffihree Power Conference in Paris, and the presenta
tion of Italy's long immomndvm on the Ethiopian situation — Mils despera
tion was evident to the Cornell members in the words of

Jesse,

(146) Althcm,$i acting in th© name of the Ethiopian Government* M, de La
Pradolie, a h m t e n , was Professor of International Law at the Chi—
varsity of Parle* and M, Potter, an American, mis Professor of Inter
national Organisation at the Institute of Int©mationai Studies, Geneva.
(I4P) 0. J, August 1935* p, 960,

m

(146)
F&ssages fro® M s address include the ftollcwl&gt
,’?rh© Pteiopian delegation has heard with great surprise the Is**
dletment of EtMopla by the Italian representative* Th© Ethiopian Govern-*
mexit desires at once to protest m t strongly against the charges brought
against it. It reserves its right to prove at a suitable time end in a
suitable rmnxmr that thsgr are groundless* For the moment It m m only feel
aaasement at this violent indictment, which it 1m s not had tins to study* ♦♦♦#
’"What Is the position today?
**fh# Walwal incident has been settled by arbitra tion. It pos—
season the authority of .res Judicata* That w a n s t h a t there is no longer a
Walwal incident! that no reaponsifeillty is incurred h Ethiopia by reason of
that incident,
"If* however, the W m b I incident, which was the only reason
adduced so far to Justify military preparaticam, has ceased to exist, what
remains?
"It is in these oircuEsartanees that Italy has Just sought a new
reason and ha# delivered her indictment. 6h© has shifted the ground of her
accusation* ® h © Walwal incident being m m worthless* this pretest having
been upset and demolished by the unanimous opinion of the arbitrators, a new
pretext is sought against Ethiopia,
"The Council will realise that* for th© moment, fearing only Just
heard this long ^tateraont, the Ethiopian Government is not in a position to
reply. But it draws te© attention of the CessioH to on© capital point* Tim©
presses* This Is no longer tee mommt for dilatory measures * The question
is Aether in a few days a war of extermination will be opened, arid It is
that point whioh the Cowell should immediately tmm&n®***
At the Cornell mooting of Booembor 10* 1955, the Boare—feairal
Flan m

th© chief topic of consideration,

Wolde Horyam who represented Ethiopia*
(149)
the point, he imxuirod of Gosievat

On this occasion it m s M,

Bis observations coming clearly to

"Is tea victim of the agression-* who has aimys scrupulously
conformed to all the procedures of the Treaties and of the Covenant — as tee
Assembly has unanimously aoEnowlodged — to be invited by the League to sub*
mlt to the aggressor and. In the interests of world peace, to abandon the
defence of its independence and integrity against its powerful ene^y, on the
ground teat tee latter*© resolve to exterminate its victim is unshakable?
is tec victim to be placed tmdor tea isstpliclt throat of abandonment by tec
League and to be deprived of all hope of succor? Should not this problem,
which is vital to the future of international relations between all peoples,
whatever tucir strength, their color* or their raee, be laid first of all
before the League, and examined publicly tear®, in complete independence*
under tee eyes of tee whole worlds
(146)0* J, Hovaster I93S, pp. 113?~115a,
(140) 0 * y, January 1956, p, IE,
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‘Eh© point raeuL© by If, W © M © Maryam on Beoembor 18 vmm re(150)
iterated by him on April SO, 1036, when he ©aid to the Councils
"Will th© Cornell he content to address to the Italian Govern—
sent, which has challenged the League of Hatlons and the whole world in the
’am© of might against right, another supreme but academic appeal for it®
co-operation, in the maintenance of peace? la that the effective assistance
which tho States Members have bound themselves to afford by sibling Article
16 of th© Covenant? Is that keeping the promise that the League made to
th© victim of th© aggression in October 1935? Will toe League bow to to©
ac-coTi^lished fact because it 1m s been accomplished by a powerful State, a d
because the victim is Isolated?*
The Council, apparently, was "content to address to th© Italian
Government•.•*•another supreme but academic appeal*"

It acood by, as has

been recounted in a previous chapter, ©bile Italy conquered Ethiopia*

Th®

attitude of Ethiopia, throughout tho spring of 1936, remained w8u>t It had
always been, one of ineffective protest and appeal to to© League,

Shat

Ethiopia was not Ignorant of the reasons for the League*s dMkothlng policy
was evident wQien, cm April 20, the report of the Committoo of Thirteen to
(151)
the Council included this paragraph!
"(Th© Ethiopian delegation) asserted that ♦in asking tlmt to©
Ethiopian Gov&rmmnt be abandoned to Its aggressor, the Italian Goranant
is in reality merely fixing its price for a bargain, whereby Italy would
give her support in a lluropean dispute in return for toe removal of sanc
tions and for the League*© indifference:; to th© Italian agression,"
Hail© Selassie himself, addressing toe League assembly on
(lb2)

dun© 30, 1936, was ©von more pointed an this subject.

He saidg

"It was a profound disappointment to me to not© tho attitude of
a certain Government which, whilst tirelessly protesting its scrupulous at
tachment to tli© Covenant,, has equally tirelessly strives to prevent its ob
servance. As soon as any nsastur* v&ioh was likely to be rapidly effective
was proposed, pretexts in one fora or another were devised to postpone ©von
consideration of that measure, Bid the secret agreements of January 1935
provide for this tireless obstruction?"
(150) 0 . J. April 1936, Part II. p. 398.
(151) Ibid., Part II. p. 361.
(152) O, J* Special StEpplement Ho, 151, p, 24,
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Chapter VI * Great Britaints Stand.
On© of th© aost interesting aspects of th© Itaio—Bthlopisaa
controversy 1© that curious combination of clreumstanee© by which Qreat
Britain, rather than Prance, ©merged a# th© champion of ©o-lXoetlvs se
curity and the advocate of effective International action against ©a ag
gressor nation*

The reasons for this stand may have lain in considerations

of empire or may have arisen from a sincere desire to ©eraent th© bonds of
intern: tlonal oo-oporetion, hat* at em& rate. It m s tlie uritish delegate,
Mr# Anthony Eden, who took the lead in attempt* to untangle the Ethiopian
sitoatlcm through collective action at Genova,
Bacbsd by Franco, British delegates to the loagi® soctsred a
premise from Ethiopian said Italian representatives In January 1985 that a
direct settlement of their differences weald he undertaken in accordance
(154)
with the Italo-Etbloplan Treaty of Amity in 1928. W s m it appeared In
April that no such sottlonont of the differences had taken plaoo, it nas
ihiglo-Protieh pressure that Italy yielded to Ethiopia*© repeated
(155)
de?jand3 for the constitution of an arbitration ©acinisalon, And in May*
when Hie Oovnoi.1 fixed a time-limit of three menttut for the settlement ef
the dispute by arbitration, It m m the British delegate stio mad© th© most
pointed remarks concerning the Ssagwf0 intoroot In th© affair,

r * Laval,

the French delegate, had Just informed the Cornell, "I moot earnestly Bops
(156)
(157)
we shall never have to reopen the discussion,*’ hat Mr* Eden said:
**2h© question with sfeleh we are dealing Is one which has
caused eerleus prooccupatIon to His Majestyfs Government.*. In matters
snoh as this, reoponsibilltios arc. involved which are those not only of
the two parties, hat of the Cornell Itself* *••*»
( 1 5 4 )
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(155) S#0 pp. 12-13*
(XM) o. J. June 1955, p. 642.
(157) Ibid.
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"It will be observed that, under the terms of the resolution*
the Ccimcil will remain in close contact v/ith the situation ana v.dll meet
again to deal with the matter should. eintnsastanoos render that course nec
essary,"
*l*r©uglLOUt these discussions* however* the desire 'fee avoid of
fending Italy was noticeable in the speeches of the British delegate, as
well && in those of other rspreeent&tlvee,

Althoo#* Hr. B e n spoka fre

quently on the subject of the African controversy, neither he nor any other
meiiibor of th© Council took note of Bail© SelassAe's requests for neutral
observer® to bo sent to the Ethiopian frontiers* or for steps to be taken
to haIt Italian preparations for w .

Britain* 111© Francs© and th© others,

cooiaod bent cm solving only th© ^ e l m l Incident.

In tbs aooner of 1935, Britain did Join with France and Italy
at th© 'flare© Pcr*cr Conference In Baris, in th© hope, apparently, that a

settlement of the affair could be worked out that would prevent further
eideate of Mi© ^alrnil ^rne and would be satisfactory Ms both Italy and
(158)
Ethiopia.,

fh© failure of these efforts has been previously roecnmted.

It we© Mr* U s n who mad© a report of the conference to th© heagti© in Septesr*

bsr 1335.

%

that time it was evident that* althou^. th© Walml decision

had exonerated both nations from blame* Italy was still pushing hostilities
against Ethiopia.

It m s at this Juncture that a not© of fore© crept inti
(159)
tii© British maneuvers at O s s m « Wr* M e n told th© Cornell m September 4 m

"la the position In which we find ourselves today, the nature
of the task which lies before the Council Is plain* It Is our duty to use
the machinery of the League that lies to our hand* bet us act it to work
f orthvrith* ***"
Meanwhile, without waiting for League action, Britain began to
(ISO)
make rapid naval preparations In Uio ZSoditerranean, It was reported that
ly Scptd^hcr 20 virtually the entire British Home Fleet had boon Gone©**<158 y Soo p.' 16.
(189) 0* J. Karedter 1935. p. 1154.
(160) Dean, Vera M.,”^h© League And the ItsIo-Ethiopian Crisis," Foreign
Bovember 6 , 1955, p. 218.

m

trated between Gthomltar and the Siv&z Ccoml* ar.d m s being reinforced
fillips from acre distant stations, by aircraft* and Is;/ troop movements la
Korth Africa*

l*Ms gesture on Britain's part* however* railed to roduae

Itjssolial to a laore conciliatory policy*

"Hie Italian press simply launched

a titter anti—Britisii easapaigit arid the Fascist regiments in Africa made
road,/- for their attach*
At this point* although it is not obvious in the actual pro
ceedings before the Leagao* Britain seems to have tocos*? nerrmm,

The League

tod not yot taken definite stops in th© direction ©f sanctions, and it togen to appear that Britain ml^xt bo left with a mediterranean oriels cm its
toads*

Sir Samuel Hoare is said to have approached Franco <m September 24

on tiro erihjact of French a M if the British fleet mere attacked by Italy,
a m
and to tore- discovered that the French m r e decidedly aaacoBiaittal* From
this point on* a greater caution is noticeable in British policy.
Fkis was the laonent seised Ibgr Itassolini for opening his mill{% m )
tary offensive against Ethiopia. The League theiosupon. found Itoly guilty
of vioXating Its Covenant ©bligatlens and proceeded to draft sanctions.
Alffcon£$x the British delegate took a m^or part in this task* hm&on m&&m
to tore toon m i l l i n g to o w m out too strongly m^Sxmt Italy wLthcnsfc the
certainty of full co-operation from the other League states, and Franc© we#
definitely pulling ©#sy from any procedure that m l^t weaken Italy to th#
advantage of Germany*

(Eh# league sanctions were therefore not a marked suc

cess*

Belayed in their application until Movesstor 1® ‘because of Angle—
CMS)
French m n a m for peace* the sanctions did not. include a?i embargo spsn

certain products kno*n to to essential to Italy’s continuance of th© cc«s—
T!l4!&Yto©n* Vera M*. ©p.cit*, ©» 219*
”
'
(1&2) Mussolini*s troop© entered Ethiopia October 3, 1935* (See p. 16).
(US) Tho PotorfiHm-St* Cfcamtin negotiations* (See pp. 23-24).

Jfotahlo.aascng these, of course, w r e petroleum and the fini
paroquets of iron*

The eaasuse given for not placing these articles on the
(164)
list m e that League medb&m did not control their production* The real

reason m s probably that Britain could not risk a

in war if that

war were to find Franco and Britain in separate warps*
its related earlier, France apparently oapitalised this British
(IB©)
fear to Bring about the Eoare—Baral flan* fills plan successfully delated
-the oiscstiafi of the oil sanction from

Hovesfeeacv 1955* until the spring

of 1956, tat it appears that Britain had no loro for the scheme,

In fact,

Hr* Bctaa practically invited the league to help M s wash his hands of the
whole deal by disapproving: of it* Speaking to the -Ctanadtteo of Sixteen
(166)
on I>ecesnber If, 1936* he said2
**£&• proposals now put forward are neither definitive nor
sacrosanct* The& ears suggestions whieh it is hoped may make possible the
beginning of negotiations* If the league does not agree with these sug
gestions, we shall «ak© no oos^plaiatf indeed, we should cordially vmXmmm
any suggestions for their improvement***.*,*
” *****W© will not only readily accept the Ju&^ptsnt of m m eol—
leagues, tat we will, continue to use our test efforts to- further the two
objectives which tore Been constantly Before us in this dispute — tl*o res—
torat ion of peace and the maintenance of the authority of the Bosgue,**
As- has Been already* explained, Mien the way was once oore open
for the adoption of the d i sanction* in the spring of 1936, France
layed the proceedings ta proposing th a t another appeal ha addressed By th®
Cidf)
gsnraitte* of thirteen to the belligerents* Before the nog© fclations result
ing ffois this anrs-al had oorao to an sn&» Gsswany*® rsifillitarlflAtion of the
(lit)

Hhineland occurred, upsetting the Bssgae+s routine m i sealing the doom of
Ethiopia*

It was therefore April Before Mr* Eden made other salient cose*-

mants to the League Council os the Ethiopian situation*
P« M .
(165) See pp* 2S-&9,
0 . d*

Bo* 14f* p* 8 *
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EtMox>ia* delivered with a dignity vhich must have evoked tlm sympathy of
each one of t»* Hot «td of us bar© present eon con template with ns& mm&»
m re of satisfaction the cireums lances in which this Assembly moots on this
occasion* it Is an occasion painful for us all..*,*
**•**.*3ad His Majocty’s (ioTfemrrsont in the tteitod Kingdom any
reason to believe that the maintenance of eadstlng sanctions, or < m « the
addition to them of other economic measures, would r©*-©stablisli th© position
in Ethiopia, then it w o l d he prepared* for its part, to advocate such a
policy, and, if other Members of the fceaga© agreed* to Join in its applies**
tion* In view of the facts of the present situation in JStMopla* His
Majesty*© Gcreramont find it iaposdU« to. entertain any mmh belief. In
our view it Is only military action ** military action — that could now pro**
duce this result. I cannot believe that, In present world conditions, such
military action could bo considered a possibility*
"Shis is th© situation with which we are confronted.**.., 1
can only repeat, and repeat with infinite regret, th# opinion that 1 have
already expressed.****»th&t, in existing conditions, the continuation of the
sanctions at present in force con serve no useful purpose* At the same time,
it is the view of His Hajeoty’s Government that Mils Assembly should not in
any way recognise Italy’s -conquest over Ethiopia,
"Ifeere ranftlss,»,«»tbe &13Hte(partant subject of th© heago©**
future* to which speaker after speaker has referred, Are we to say, because
we have failed on this occasion to make the rale of law prevail over the rule
of force, that %m are therefore finally to abandon this object? Certainly
not* His Majesty* @ GorettBasnt cannot accept such a view* How many efforts
have been needed In history to realise objectives of far less significmo© .
to th© ultimate destiny of the human race? With such an objective as this
before us, our endeavour most be ©entered upon the task of reconstruction* *«
Ho it w

that Mr* Mxm e«!si©wX©dge& the failure of British

policy in the 1t&lo—Ethiopian conflict,

That policy, ©rijjinally eoi>~

dltlonod by British imperial inter©-ts in Africa mid in tl.ie llediterransaii,
by a desire to preserve the haagme of nations, and by an unwiXXtrrpiose to
disrupt the i ^ce of Europe, had broken down because of Its ©oraplexi ty*
Tktable to accomplish the alh>««i)iM3apaB9ing program embraced by these factors,
the government apparently had singled out its most important aim, and had
clung only to that*

’EM© aim seems to have been the preservation of

koropean peace, sad for It# realisation iteming Stroc had permitted a
diplssantio defeat both for Great Britain said for th© league*
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eb&ptar VXX — France*© Position*
It wis Franco* more them any other norfber of tho League, which
m&mtmd to desire, almost at any price, tho ooocili&tion of Italy in the
Italo-Bthiopian conflict*.

She discomfort of tho French o w

tho controversy

and their determination to ©ffeot a speedy esbfcXcsasaat, If possible, mwrs
evident to tlao League Comail as: early as August 5, 1935, during the Cornell
session ^ i e h 1limited the competence of the arbitration commission to the
40 -facto clrmBB®-tema©e of the balwal incident* and agreed to the appointment

of a fifth arbitrator to the Coraaisslaa* At that time, M» Laval, s m m m o f n g
the French attitude, indulged in platitudiaou® ©omaents shout the lofty

<175)
purposes of M s country and of the La&gus*

Ho s&idi

appointment of a fifth arbitrator permits the Comic 11
•to hop© that all will he don© for a final settlement of the Walwl incident*
mI!h© Cornell will thus have fulfilled once more its gre&t and
noble mission* All thoe© throughout the world who remain attached to the
Gen©m Institution vdll rejoice,
”W© have achieved our immediate task; hat the situation re
mains serious* as representative of France, iry role is not at an end* In
#v@ry w * I shall do all in my power to explore ©vary possibility of con
ciliation* True to th© obligations of the Covenant ana in response to the
unanimous feeling- of nr ecmitry, 1 am ready to- assta© this task and will
carry It fchroujb. to the end* We shall allow no chance of poacu to escape
us."
It i» noticeable even at this date that It was "peace”* mot
"Justice”, vdileL was the object of M* £ s w d fs concern*
to figure largely in the French remarks*

"Bee©©** continued

Qm September 4, 1955, at the

league Council meeting which was darkened by report of the failure of the
Tkreo l o m r Ooafsreme and by the introduction of Staler** mmmrzmdxm on th#
Ethiopian situation indicating

Passes refusal to permit the Walml de

cision to settle the ItMo-Ethicpl&n differences» M* Laval m©&© the follownwrb; x

w « t

1^5, p. 'war.---------------------------------------
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lag ©©laments* apparently designed to smooth over the situation*
"Iraaoe remains ardently attached to the work of conciliation
undertakes* tinder the authority of the League of S&tione* She adheres to
her bolief that pease ©an still he ensured within the framework of the
Covenant.
**Xt follows that the Connell will have the wholehearted co
operation of the Freach represents tIve in the fulflUnasnt of its present
task* 1 refuse to believe that this mxprmm effort is doomed to failure
and that an equitable settlement cannot be found* one affording Italy the
satisfaction sh© ©an legitimately ©late without disregarding the fundamental rights of Ethiopian sovereignty#
**W« shall listen to our Italian oolle&gu© in a moment# Els
grievances will# I am sore# he examined by th© Council with the most care
ful attention. X feel certain that the roprcsentativ© of the EXngdosi of
Italy# cm M s side# will bring a spirit of bro&tein&ed conciliation to the
consideration of any proposal that m y h© mad© to him#
.....We are all anxious to respect the obligations
©f th© Covenant. W© are all determined to serve the cause of peace*"
When it became obvious that Italy had resorted to war in de
fiance of its Covenant obligations* France concurred in the indictment of
(ITS)
tbs aggressor nation by the Connell. France was represented on the Go—
(170)
ordination Committee and the Committee of Eighteen, and accepted the four
(Iff)
original proposals of those committees with regard to sanction** It th©
time of tho Committee of Sixteen* s first session# however# reports were
current of secret negotiations at Paris with regard to effecting peace by
{178}
giving Italy th© concessions demanded by Mussolini as M s price*
France was not on© of th© nations which agreed to participa
tion in the proposed oil sanction* this subject being omitted entirely in
th© French correspondence with the Secretary—General of th© Leagueregard
ing th© recommendations of th© Co-ordination Committee.

It wasFrance#

In

fact, which seemed most determined* by various and sundry means* to keep
th© oil sanction from being added to the list of coercive measures against
(174)
(175)
(ITS)
(177)
{178)

0. J. Eovember 1955, pp.
Ibid#* p. 1825*
0. J. Special Supplement
0. J. Special Supplement
®b© Peterson-St * Quentin

XI34—1155.
Ho* 145* p. 8*
Ho. 150* pp. 151—154*
negotiations* (See pp. 25-84).
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(179)
Italy.

As described in a preceding chapter, tli© Hoare—b&rnl Plan, which

undoubtedly bad its origin Is th© Frsncsb mind, seems to have bean ad
vanced in Beceiijber 1935 as a possible means of securing peace without
hairing to pash the League*s case against Italy farther*

This plan* by

which Italy would have been given a large slice of Ethiopian territory*
was repudiate by public opinion in both Frame and Britain before
Ethiopia Itself refused the arrangement, but Tl# Laval*s comments cm the
0 qImob to the Committee of-Sixteen are lute resting*

Speaking mi December

(180)
12, he said in part*
"Whan* two months ago, the Council and Assembly were c o r h
polled to roeogals© that the effort mode with a view to a peaceful settle
ment of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict had failed, it was made clear on more
than one occasion that* whatever the cIreurastonces and whatever th© course
of the proceedings unde? the Covenant* th© mission of conciliation de
volving on the League of Nations was not terminated.*#**
"I* for ay part* said that w© must endeavor to seek* as
speedily as possible* for an amicable settlement of the dispute* and 1
added that *Tim French Government and the Halted Kingdom Govezmamt are
agreed that their co-operation Shall be everted also is this sphere *****
"Such are the circumstances in whlch the Crovemments of France
end the United Kingdom had felt that the moment had com© to see whether it
would not be possible to find a basis for mi amicable settlement#***
"The Italian and Ethiopian Governments were informed yesterday
of cur suggestions, w© propose to communicate them shortly to the Council
of the League*
"Our part will then have been played* and it will be for the
League of Hattons to settle what is to be dona* We are confident at least
that the League
appreciate the loyalty of our efforts, th© only object
of which (let wm repeat) has been to expedite * within the fransework of the
League* th© settlement of a conflict th© continuance of which weighs so
heavily upon the world*”
There Is a marked contrast between these coraaents and those
made b: Mr* Eden on the ©am© occasion.

It will be recalled that th©

British delegate referred to th© proposals as "neither definitive nor
sacrosanct*" and annotate©d tli&t he would "cordially welcome suggestions
(181)
tear thair lnrproTeraent.''
(179) See pp* 28-30*
(180) 0* J* Special Supplement He# 147, pp* 7-8*
(181) See p* 67*

m

Altkou^ the Boare-toml Flan delated the oil sanction. For
several months, the Commiti®© of Eighteen eventually appointed a Ctaoatttoo
of Experts to consider the petroleum situation* and the report of tiies©
exports was presented on March 2*

This time it was M* Plan&in who made a

move in boh&lf of France, and, incidontally, of Italy* by su^eoting* he-*
for© the Committee of Eighteen considered the report, tliat the Cckvrdttee of
Thirteen {the- body charged with effort# at conciliation) should moot again
(1@2)
and "apoeal to th© belligerents to put an end to th® war*" 2h© CoEtsltte© of
(1S$)
Thirteen* as related earlier, did make such an appeal on March 3* 1936, and
it was while tie League was occupied with negotiations resulting from this
eoHBsaniOi tlon that the Italian armies won their victory in Ethiopia,
On April 20* 1936, after France*s worst fears had been realised
in Germany’s remilitarisation of the Ehineland, M* Paul—Bonesur, speaking
(%m)
before the League Cornell, bluntly expressed the French view thus*
"If w® are to meet the present threats to Europe* we need peace
In Ethiopia* The situation of a great country in relation to the League
must he regulated so that that country may participate in the work of Euro
pean reconstruction s and I note with satisfaction that the representative of
Italy says M s country is of the same mind***
In th© same address* If* Paul-Boncour went mi to explain to some extent the
direction of French thinking.

Be said?

"ify colleagues from the other continents will forgive me if I
deploy tiie word Europe* somewhat frequently* It la assuredly not that l
forget that solidarity of which cur Institution is and must remain the ex
pression, Still less is it because X am not aware that dark clouds are
gathering to some extent throughout the world* But X feel sure that they
will understand that various events, ,, •.direct cur thoughts to that part of
th® world for which w® are particularly responsible* *.* *"
This deliberate dismissal of the Ethiopian cause by France may
seem cold-blooded* but there Is no doubt that the policy was dictated by
<182) See p. 32.
(183) Xd«a.
(184) 0. J. April 1936, Part II, p. 38,

what the ^la&I &*0rsay considered to te a necessity for Franca*

l
£horo is

no doubt* either, that it was the French position which residered th© League
impotent in the Italo—Bthiopian ©rial#*

Almost under French pro tootion*

tlie Fascist troops in Ethiopia drove Hello Selassie from his throne*

It

nigbt have been ©apected that* in the final analysis, the French delegatee
would have offered some mitigating reflections upon their action* but no
such gesture was forthcoming*

The long address made by M* Blum at the

Assembly meeting of June 50 to July 4* 1956* was concerned almost: entirely
with a plea to

th©

nations to forego their armaments and their warlike

policies* so that th© world might look forward to an era of peace*

There

was no analysis of the situation through which the league had Just come*
and there was no concrete definition of the position of Franc© in the family
of nations*

ihe speech was full of idealistic general!ties, with the
(1SS)
following paragraph furnishing perhaps the most tangible thesiss

"Franc© will endeavor to reconcile her loyalty to law and her
will for peace* She does not wish to pronounce* upon acts that are eon**
tr&ry to law* m y absolution that would amount to encouragement* She does
not wish to call for war to provide reparation for rt^ht* But* shove all*
she is thinking of th© Europe of tomorrow* and her ambition is to draw
from the present dismites a contribution no real peace, organised peace*
indivisible peace* disarmed peace. She sees only m o a re method of win**
ing out the past* and that is to create a new future***.*..**
Who student who follows H« Blum* s phrases has the fooling
that ha was seeking to create a nebulous atmosphere in which no shapes
would stand out very clearly and in which the Ethiopian corpse might pass*
in pleasantly veiled fashion* to an obscure grave*

|lSS) 0, J. special Supplemmt Eo, 151,’p. 29.

?S

Cfcpator illI - Tim Attitude Of

Soviet tksion.

*£h© XtaXo~&tMoplan affair found th© norost xaeistbor of th©
(IGS)
hoa.niG of nations* th© Ttoion of Soviet Socialist Beptiblies, ©adhibiting a
pronoimeod devotion to th© doctrine of collective security and a \>llllng~
ness to us© all measures necessary to ensure its ©bserv&nc©,

As E, Litvinov

pointed out, this attitude on th© part ©f his government was prompted neither
by any unfriendlin© os toward Italy nor by any consideration of Russian re
lations with Ethiopia*

It was rather, according to M* Litvinov, a case of

(is?)
saying*
"Plato is ujy friend, hut international solidarity, th© principle
of collective security on which th© peace of th© world today is founded,
loyalty to international undert&kings, must for th© time being drowii tha
vole© of friendship,"
Whether Bassia#s mioosipromising stand for sanctions was actually
die tateft by th© altruistic reasons which M« Litvinov offered, or by th© hop©
of strengthening r a system which ndUJht serve the Soviet (Jovornmenl; well in
some future hour of need, is a matter of question*

it is not easy to forget

that th© tX*S*S.Tu, at the time of the Xtalo-Ethiopian controversy, had
reason to fear possible aggression against Its own territories from two
directions, fro® Japan on the eastern frontier, and frota Germany on the west
ern frontier.

r
H mt at least one of those potential enemies of Russia

figured in M, Litvinovas calculations, is obvious from his own remarks before
the League Council on September 6, If30,

On this occasion the Soviet dele

gate, in dealing with the subject of Italy*© action, kept harking back to
another Instance of aggression in th© League's history, and to th© un
desirability of repeating the failure which the League had sustained in that
ILSJB*B* was'
~tE*> Li«J^,1^ l S ^ t « ^ r '2^,''"iLSSSS,
»r,n"’.....
(187) 0. J* Special Supplement Ho, 151, p, 35*

m

tthle referene© *m& worded in euoh a mt# that it. xx**
miatafcafcly e,ppHod to dfepanese penetration ®f SisKteiiw
<XG3)
saM f

hitarinov

*We fn*© £lsis©&
the direst threat of Inpendin# fajHih&rgr
operations between two l^fabers ef the £ee@»e# b§r a throat of .ft^reooleii
which is not only not denied, but* on tts© © t m t m y ©enflriaod hy the
repseacntnhl?o of Italy hlisseif# Can, w Ignosw this tftveet and forget
the ea&steoee of Articles 20* II* a?sd IS of tte ISewweutt of tlio
Would that not he a 'flagrant violation
the 0®vonmt| wsmM. mat ito
violation Tsgr the whole Ceasseil jsboh ^b© eonplcte repudiation and
the Covenant?
W1 esey he reminded of a precedent ^ 0 1 ,.tb» Connell of ttm
not tai** all naeeeesry iieas'ercs for the f&oreni§on of a mm**
filet between two Wm&hmm of the ho& xtB* But this in «s#tly a thing to
ho ressemherod now. for no m i still fool In whet* measure that e*«e wea3e~
ened the hoagne of Ilotions, diminished Its sathori ty sad ceartrlba&^d to
the eveAtion of the politically unatehla* amamaMng situation in which th©
world finds Itself and even* aey bo# to the a r t o f tfc© present eon*
filet*
fho repetition of that precedent would
offnet ©tad* In Its toon* weald
footing th© whd© cf SdPO'ps#*#* *
*V*****I an booed to rotated you that* In the erifertnn&t©
roffererieee'to tMtoeirdnsas* Internal disorder* had ad**
and -mo on* ftsgr© Is no dmsbb that* at any attempt at a@*
0p®mion* similar or other JustifleottaaMi will ho put forward* In cqr
.mod* tin? fiesta* of Hatfaeai should stand fina on the principle that there
earanftt he jttstifleellaa for miitary operations owapt In self-defenee*
In the m m m m y as no eneh JitetiflcaiJLsn I© afelttod by the Brlani*
foot fcrMddln.,.war ae on t&strensnt ef n&tJsna& policy
fosterer tlas motives behind the -aet&an of the Sorlot
the poliey rspro^ntod hy its dele^tes hefor© ^ e he^ine In notiooahle
for the ecmol8ha£^s its for^»fn3noM» and its
with the lihsss ef

Mtrlno^ on

part ef ^diloh in cg&oted ©hore* and centlfmin,.;: te the res^r end ef the
oontrover^r*

the
^rcn^ed tiieir
the isms® with a

snr «§i

% m*

si^emhondimee ef
eiroesi^

point vdth a -snirprlslng and. pertep# &iteoBosrtlnclarity*

iHxr

Xasteteo*

Mm I*ttrtaa**r*s ttemts M ematimr portion ef M m tpaeeh alrea<3y
(189)
Xneii&lad the foMowingf
*1 m

eartgr to say ttet 1 msmrnt m ^ m ® site tte t«sy of w »
H e t e t e : i n tte C taranant o f
tte te&^ao entitles ss*.»«t& dissrtetnate teiseeis tenters of M m tmmggm
m® to their intomfcl regime* tte eolor of tte-Xr okiri* teelr reels! dl*»
ttaetlens or tte eta* a of their
nor aae^r^lci.|^ to doprlv©
some of toon of privileges vhiofc ftes? em$®^ la virtu® ©f tte&r inocstapw
Ship of the tenge®* end* la tte first pteee* of ttelr 1 ^ 1 tenable sri|#it
to integrity and. fetetmtasstt* I 'mmtmm to sagr that* for tte toretep**
smst of tesfcmuni peoples* for infloo-aoin ; iiselr intoiiml life* for
raising tte® to a higher civilisation* otter irsormo t t e sx&ltacgr laay te
U*
o f t t e r e p r e s e n t a t iv e o f Italy#-**.** •

t* Indlet 11

for It#

I t sae M*
*•$$» dseteloa istiloh tlsfif Council is- ateat to tate aai^s tte
end of tte state of ^settee ate teeteMri&omu 1 « H X therefore male® no
now st&te&set* $te ttttHmte ehlsfo sp
is tnUng is tte pro&Xss
nmt twder eotHgiterefcioe’tes b & m st^iteteerity defined %gr me* 2tet atti**
tado is dteesriiaed by tte principle® shic& X ter© stated both in tte
Council and Ia 'tte- teeos&Xy* and those principle® lease as doefet as to
tte wtmptmm $@r teffmmitt sill giro to any proposals sfeieh tte Cmmo-il

saote for’safe^BMuniiRi£r tte pesos in Africa* as sell a s I®: otter

m

aefl8 of $}v» TSaaocm gowoinciettt t» ©©wopnra&e in tte ©xtonoiaft of ©©notion©
to t M s ©aerateIt? w&ff ho taken as ©©idenoe of a coneyote dostre to a9»
plot in tim fymgiw tKk&ortssfe^n^
Baring dooi&te open its ooortso, tte Soviet Shim
to tevo boon ©eornftel of attempt© to gloee ofsr tte ©itartticm, or to
offor Hoooollni a prio® for poaeo* At tte extraordinary session of th©
iiimcpe CoonoiS. In tendon frorn. Htroh 14 to Meioti 84,

oallod to

disooss €tans*a$r*© notion in roteXitartsin/? tte nhisotend* 11* Litvinov
not Oftl2? «te© a rofteon©© to tte
teth tte Qmmm-i

Kteiiopian affair In tte ©ots@ b&anth

nanaoo, ’feat also InSolgod in %#jat ooof^s to tew© boon &

pointed roffero&ee to tte

Blast and VLfm te^tiation©*.

II©

i© tte third tte©, to tte short ported of ©ightooa
ramtte’&ttriii vdUoh tte' tertot Iftilon ha© teen a tiaeter of
Sa&iocss, 'that tte »#p»wcs«ntetit» on tte Coonail of tte
epo&k on tte ©ahjeot of m brooch of tetenmtion&l
fir©-: ttio© was in cwoneotim ©dth tte infrin^jcnont tq
Ssraai^ of tte a&lltarsr e t e a of tte foroatilo© Snooty, 5te -&mm^
tin© o©» m tte- ©ocosilosi of tte tt©te"«IA0Ptebii«n oonftiot* fte third,
ttear* i© 1« o«s^i©^^te© of tte tBsilateraX lafrlngsssBot by Qemmi^ of
both tli©' Versailles ®roatgr and tte Jjoeamo Boot*
‘’In ail
©©ms©
-teriot Union m o fitter tegaHi'
Olslntoroetea hmomm® it tools no part in tte iMa-tl*©
ted tern Is
fartnnjed, a© In t o oa#@ of t e e of foreaiiX©© ©ant tee&rao, or, a© in
tte oaso of tte Italotei^atenion ©esifllot, it© © m interoo&s w m m not
in tte least affected*
.
vill not in tte proocnt eoai proreiit, tte s&mrmmi tatir® of tte teviot

Hsiai from taktu# M e place ma&ng t e e tester© of tte Council ite

rocietor in tte moot &mminis® ©Minor ttelr indtemtton at a breach of

international ©bll&otiono, e®ftd®g*i It, ate
&©te©f©© to e s r l ©tollor tnffetst^pMnoobfi in the fistnm.
for tte collectiv© QTigmim**
t i m of

"P© #o not, teoover, ©la©?} aiaon^ ©ach wmtmarom coXXective
In tte tte© of tte' t^greseor, In tte fan® of an infringetuont of treat loo, or oolloctiro encouragement of m m teffetagooante,

A

t e l I, p* Sit,
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©n& still tess oolleotivG agreement to a tfcmm Tor ths s.£*.toodof h;.-*
adopting ft basts of outset*!*# or other plans* aoeoptabte or profitable to

tlm Bdrtoeititno, the ^ asatan tetsg stj© ft* t t e teftgao C ounatl
a o a sto n st Gmoeva on April w » X9?6* tdjoafl tbs sentlraente o f M s fellaft.
eou&txstfm tten he p&zwasd the st^Jeel of teslas abtigatfcr^ and tl-iotar
{£94}
omsloft Is this fashion*
**«•«• .*^bo international -prest!^ of the League ssu: the
sffeeiieeosss of Sto action m m M . bo $&l*e differs#* If 4 1 tbs
without sampttei bad adopted an ts^cK^rorrdslnp ©ttttn&e bcnaeu.'&a ar$r
and ansr f t t e a r act of a g g r e s s io n *
^Sbe&r mmti aftopt t h is a ttlb u te # a o t cssl^ a t Geneva* Im t
Wmbe stead . a g a in s t t b s aggsm aov* a a pmwM®& fo r in tb s
0sv©nati* o f Ida© teaga© o f Ilfetloiio* nos* bo t e t h soX tocti?© and tndi-rldxm l*
of the post fee months M s breast*.«Msapf^intm®n* te
of the tesgss* Vbegr ore distressed to -see# the* ©res sitte
there is a tendency to tract sn aggressor with a s t
swan in&ulgoneo the laoro ftrrocpasii ©arid banftQ&ms hm titimm
f«t
5*hor@ m t m tern-

before th© Gosmil she teaonsiratad

of ttesa mmmXrnw tie sail &> spade a «pa&
gates wars still erino&ig this tnl^i© s&tlltgr ft* the
Jwie 26 to

4*

l m *bo sod sod of tilm
oasalans of possible we&mme ta the Magas mattiscgr*

ft*© sdxxutes of

t b s G o n m jil s e s s i o n o f da3Ly 2 6 # 's fttb regard t o 15* M tv tn o ^ * © e te n d r o sftg

*V. *..For M s own part* be was sot so so?® hgr
o eam
that Mi® Mags® tisadad rsfesat and# antil proof m s ftortbooraing M m t it
d M « bo proposed to resent M s attitude on the general tenis of reform.*»
*te bo m s tikm poftttlm* the &mg*m mm It stood and Mss
Ccmoant as It stood bad not broken dom..* 'There «aa reason to dojalors
tte failure to safe® tall m m of all th# ssupsaft
for Mis defense and protection of the te&opsnteri&e of all States
oit*» Bart Xlf
J* JM|f 1980» Bart 11# pp* MSSMfBS,

i© 110%
.ter ©IX* m i tefteii tepmiab
mlgr m
t e <®r m
I M te test* tefe *te» ©n tep u m i i i ©T m r i ^ t e i e s ** #n^pi§t a m p

m

Cteptor xz - Th© iittltn&e 0f Tim BtmlX Itetion©*
th© mmXl ms&tm te tfc«
a destrn to

til!©

©f
ooam

Bottarsi* since tte ireaor ©x&staaeo of the wmbSJmt

©t&te© dopoRted* in ©ergr Instances* tipon tte mihtoiMWioe of tte rote of
Thor© f&8 « hearer, no raotsitslt#' of •syedor
in 61©eiifinstn& tteiv Cteecftat teOUtetionft*

diet©too of ttei?
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with grief* hut without #iirjsri0 @*w Albania* -to all pvaetleol pn*»
poees* was an Italian protectorate* ®o tenen&ent i^pon Italian oaplfca&
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that a 'brmstk with ter patron### would
teon antMaferhlo* X?i Aan&vte*
tte gawevanent -of Dr* son SolMNMfeklgjgr « i under a tebt of gretitnd& te

MtmelSnl for- M g assistance in confeatting tte Sf&ai i&utacli of 2954, and
tte perocBsstl tte Detsmtt tte -nsler# in YtettB& ©ad Baim
tmm5
tesestaad Dr* ran tetamta&ggHi polity*. Da tte- ana© of

Italian

support imm teased necessary if' Hsn^asy war© to secure art eren&uttl ?&*»
rteion of tte Treaty of tetaMB* #© tbat ttere wa# no testtaacy i*i.
pent cnrer
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in your cable mast te tsten if Congress. In view Of conditions efot&toin* te t M ® eonntrsr* tte Gm m rm am t 0m® not teas it teatmfcle for tte
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tte tex&KSt of ##f#ral loon#.**.which, in effect* pat Albania In
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rsarriayo and h* a. &azmmi suspicion of Tti^slaria* v m m out In
fteor of oil the proposed sanctions except th© ©13. 'seter^B# said on this
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silent, as w a
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th e t e l l s h

govsntaont toward tire- teagae In reseat years right have foreoaei,
fooaX to teMjperate* Spain -mid SHlh^rteNS* hotl* tear Belabors of tte
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fom&dahle
ill set let tfeds ffcet deter them frost pitting the tea^te
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**$te problems %tet distr&ot Sarop# ^ c m M not he loft to tte
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Hitler replied to this mstm W

ehallenging the SewieSl*® rig£»t to tmso

£adgn®nt against Cksspfsangr# ty rejecting th© moltition a® an attempted
disorlssSiritlott against Germany, and Be roaorvine tte right to reveal at a
(216)
later &&t@ the fall atfcltad® of th® 2©leh*
A® a resalt of the Gersam situation, dlverg^est trends he~
« s » evident in hho.pollelas of Britain end Bpss®©, Britain adopted a
tomrd the Modi, eventually ©oncli^iin^ m Anglo**
hy ehieh Bitter m s left free to es&ond hi® re«*
Car]
roseola.
Frame, on the other hand, refused to seise a^r eonoeselons to Hitler, and
tasedlatedy mmgfrt to rednfbroe her eesorlty hy tneetas of aillnne©® -with
ether potential orioles of Q<ma«^*

On Bey 2* 1355* a 3hpaneo*"’
&©8i©t past

of ssstmsl esoisrtane© m m ®&gm£I* Thar© w

a flare of resentment la

Gernany mi thus subject of th is past* Shiah lUtlor professed to regard as
a violation of
Boieh*

TMs h©li&

X*oe&m® Obligations end a direct iSirosfc at the
m m

attitode on M m p est o f GsevMQr#

It Qzmiiit th® French at a ported o f temporary
rendered Italy all th© more important to Fresno© m m an ally*

In M o say*

Germany*® affaetage role* even in the spring of 1 9 ^ gav® ssotde® o f
holng a doterfalnisG factor, eertotnly st© far as Ffcaaee sos ooaeemod, In
th© attitade of the Leagu© fesnrd Italy*® Afrieats project*
S^sa^u,
FfrMW

11^ftaep^*
^ W J » I t * ItSfi* P *

W r a S S H ^ * * 1w^ rirT''rrT'“ '
wz«

(217) Visetelly, Prank 2«* and aesoclates, .*23&e H®s Jnto^iational loap Booic*
195®/ p* 28It **©» J'on® 18 the Boieh snored a net&fcle diplomat!® tarfc-*osaph By concluding a naval
with Britain is ehieh Kitlar
agreed to limit the proposed Gorraan fleet to 88 per sent of British
naval tamag©* By than giving official recognition t® Oersaany*® trio—

lation of the Versailles Treaty* Britian nullified Mm Stress, agreement,1*
(218) Bean* Vera Moholee* op* elt«» pp* &38-103*
(219) m s * * p* IBs*
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Hot

urns MXtier assisting Ifcisaolini, tmt also- itusjooiini

m s &ooti»©d to assist Hitler mtovo the conclusion of the Xt&Xo^hiopittB conflict, -Im spit# of the f&ot that, in both eases, M m assto*
tara»o ££y hairo boon entirely isaintentioaml*

Hitler* hy distracting

Genova*g attention to the 1» & s of tho Rhine, m e helping Boeeoliai to
tie M m hands of %lm

with regard to hie African exploits*

iJ^ssolJM,

in mmssossfully demonstrating the i&sffee1ivensss of the collective iqiMi
of seeurlfgr, m o proving a teeth sfcfteh Hitlor tea Xc«ig sospectsd and want
tore wished snlently to see eswpXlfSsd*

the face of lt# co-oi^a&ioti

of this sort laight hare seoraod to m m X t m closer eelistienship Between the
too dictators, hot there m e soother fnctor which leapt the 1»
w l s apart*

f
i!hi® m s the ^iiestish of their eoaflietleg mXsm An Austria.

Hitier*® Amrtrien ftctivitieB of 1954* resulting is the assassination of
BolXftiss* lied so ssofisecl oho ire of Italy that the Breach he** tween Berlin end S o m could not he easily healed,

fhere m s no indica

tion* therefore, of mm ZtnX&*@mmmm mggmms&mmmt at ©ggr %iwm during th©
Bthiopiim eentrsr©r«y* iSfcsh ©f # 1© two sistes ©©sms, ftesertheieae, to
have profited from tlm settoo of the other cimriag I93B and 1936.
is fisssolini*® troop© la Africa piled vtotory open victory

and the ioipe delayed in taking- dseislw action, with the differences
Between French ©ad British policy Beooraing sors end sore apparent, nasi
CSorSiSOaHy, lh the spring of 1936* ©ad© another hold stroke*, This time*

followiiig on the heels of the French CSaftsaher*# ratification of tic
Frenoo-Soviot pest of satsd assistance. Hitler, on Hareh T» dcnoimcod
{£20} Sean, T o m Michele©, op* sit*, p* SI*
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fro® President
Beosevelt m

released in the fft&taft States*

dent wetted tosrtean m & Z m m & m

In this asssnge* toe Presi**

travel an belligerent vessels, and

stated* in faaated contrast to t3t© traditional position of the tailted States
\/ith regard to neutrai rights on the Mirb seas* that snch travel w o l d he
tent
to Inelada "transactions of map character with either of the halllgeren to,**
in ether words* American trade with foreign nations at war was no
to sttjcgr gersrnMilaE protection*

it we# a jsrofMwoeeiimt full of

ftcanoe for a i » H unaaetsBtaaed to fmeh utterances from the
Western teate^here.

of the

it the raoraent* the nations asoecajiod at Geneva. could

rejoice* haeanse it ai^piified their iassdt&te task* hat the newc? scald
set here fallen as mi

Messing upon baagtt© ears*
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Asserloan people by a st&tomnt from President iieoaevelt* who saidt
*,,*A new and definite step 1* taken "fey providing In m\h~
et:nee that* ^d&en m. m & s & m becomes effectire, obligation® of any bel~
llgorent Government issued after the date of the proclamation shall not
bo pureh&sed or o o M in this country* and no lorn or credit extended to
such Qoverttxamt, but with the authority of th© Hxeeutlve, If our inters
os to roqptro# to except from the prohibition oonsnorcial credits and short-*
term loans in aid of legal transactions* la addition* It in general sx~
ewpts the other republics of this hemisphere from the operation of the
law*”
3?he President* who had last renewed his proeliHa&tlons of
(235)
the jaNaseding autos®, went on to say*
*®&i© policies announced by the Secretary of Stab# and syself
at the time of and subsequent to the issuance of the original pro©XaiaeM;ian
will Ini saaintained in effect* It Is true that the high moral duty I hare
urged on our people of restricting their experts of essential war materials
to either belligerent to ag^proa&metely the normal peace-time basis has not
been the subject of legislation* nevertheless* it is elsar to m that
gssetty to ©xeosd -that basis, with the result of earning profits not pes*
slble during peace* and ©specially with the result of giving actual assist
tanoe to the ©arcing-on of war* would serve to magnify the very evil of
war whleh we seek to prevent* Tktm being ay view* 1 renew the appeal made
last October to the American people that; they so conduct their trade with
belligerent nations that It eaaiiol be said that they are seising wmm ep*»
portunities for profit or that, by ©hanging their peaco-tlzae trade, «hey
giro aid to the eentittusnce of wear.*
$be swift denouement of the 1 talo~2£thiopian story within
the next few weeks left the Hailed States of America no alternative
other than a revocation of the various proclamations which had boon la
operation for the past mine snaths* and accordingly* on dbme S©* 193$*
the President issued new messages* eomtermandln, his earlier exeg&»
cm)
live orders* fheee dbme proclamations * lifting the eatoarg© of the Halted
States against the

belligerents*

were forwarded to Geneva, share* within

& week* the leegee Comte 11 was to meet for the purpose of writing finis
to the Xtalo-^thlopian chapter*
lp5Eiyi-o^r^ir^5S!S[^!,
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ttet tee ItftUta arg'ttsxmfc®, In 19B5* «©r© a ne?© pretoet*

»inoe

the govermaerit at B a m eoneietantly refased to agree to any

f .T9**

organisation i& StMopla tinder teteteattoiial ©upervtalon.
^te tanaavory ease ©eeteet Italy in the Btelopim affair ia
increased By tte foot ttet the illegal as© of poison goo appears to teve
aeoountod for no m&ll

isoooeepo

of tte Fascist allttessr saeoeee over the

eoldior® of Haile Selassie* Both Ethiopians end foroin observers oot&~
plained to tee teagae to the spring of 1956 that each gases sore being
mood By the Italian®* alteou^i teoir tae represented a violation of inter**
national laiPi Bather ©onolsisive evidence teat the tesoists did resort
to this M m . of centering a telpiess people is furnished both By the
roeords of the h o Canal Colony* pasted' Before the teaga© to the effect
that large sptfn&Hfc&s* of various
Italian armies hi Beat Africa * and tgr the
of d’gristo* Investigating otergss against te® belligerents* that* ofclX*
Italy specifically denied other ©tergos* *tte Italian Ck»v®rnta©fit iaafte no
etatenant a® to steteer steh gases ted or ted. fi-ot Been

.** It

»« ttet 123© Italian sttaolc upon
and laokin

in justifie&tion* tet ©Is© p » M

igr illegal gisnas*

If Italy*s position Sa tte Xts&csMtktosdaa conflict 1#
j* the stacuf of the teaguo itself le scarcely tee©' ©ulp&bX#*
ISNMi^fc It Indie ted Italy for **r®sorting to ear la disregard of it© ©ore-*
rsants*** Ceneva at 330 time esp&eQrod tte foil, tsaehlnory provided 1©

*

protocol of 1925 ted imtlaeed
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In tte e&ae
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tte ®@gr#@oor artate* and sa&de no move la tte direction of military n e e *
tioss® or of M m oatpalolcm of Italy ftesi teo^e# aosterotiSp*

^hmm w m m mmmmf rmmonm for tte failiire of tho Mm^m to
Snp&mettt its f o U ftpsaigtli agaltet Italy.

0lilof among tte® m o tte fact

teeogfct oat % Mr* Anthony M m that, ™M&m diojrata m m not
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Isolated
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event in 0 world which had no otter omam- for mxXotp**9 fa m JSeerop®

« b I to tte teeth* mm St m i la 1915* tte poosSMlity of a ^rnmmX m m
loot castlon to all dlplomtlo endeavor®. Besides this general condition*
which weighed heavily upon tte mfa&m of oil tte otateo&en at toffHt t e l
tew# poSttSesii mXtmtimm in ▼ortois# quarters of tte world vdilch m d o Mom
of a micgpMtat Italy i ^ r miweSteiae to tte mlggtterlng Jteopea®
oonntrlao*

Iter# wero* moreover, certain oGonomie interests oe tte port

of Individa&l temp*®# ommtriom v&ieh ®#$» scess of ttea rotmo to apply
w o n ©conoraSe sanction® against Italy* fte toanlt of all the#® t e t e t
warn a SaoSs: of sotMartty «t O o w a which rendered effective notion
*galnot an o@gs#«sor nation practically SapessSBSe*
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■Of ^ l i o n araaag tte te&^a® esotero* U m m m tetefeopped itself* s*s tte
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tte eoiioeBtreblee of Italian tetejpd to teto iyfrlcn aoi

M a rogteot® for neutral Oteerver* to te eent to tte BtMoplaa frontier*
ted failte to got reopen## fro® tesseva* *Ite league otoiee* perliape de~
literateIgr* 414 oteoltoe^f Kotteeg ostSl SSftoeoXtnl*0 lailiiary e#epaS|pi
vil already wade? way*

By tte* tteo» Mi# atttaafoivmmMiM of econoBiie

■tlc ^ s 'oa# sfiNPteoflBy tepalfed# hirtfrriotfr J& J2§36§. ^4- te d aiapl# tte o to
to m®mmlot# advaooe s M i of tte eoaaoditie# litely ,to te en&tegoeft*
(MSI
.tem«oe*# ae M* Feteeddtae oegggeeted* tte pqpiteleg^o&l factor of * pro
ject actually lo operation to defiance of tte t e p i covenants w m & m ted
tte power of teneva and paralysed tte efforts
Ste to tte 1 iteoo attitude a* -C t o m « a tte most serious
&mmbmfc to effective league action e^aioat Italy eae France* fte poote
-'StOB. of lte**©e aiagr te

to tesas of tte- totoisaai ootoltSoQO
(Mf)
pMeaillag in ttet country at tte time, rod of tte I t e o of dersoaay which

wore requiring Ito&oe to aamaae an especially

mmtimm

role In inter**

national affaire* tot it to none tte tote true that tte French delegate*
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tills SQNOOditQfr the ln& lentIons wore that the Uhlted States scmld have
followed suit, sln.ee *1! other prodtarfcs covered hy the League sanctions
were en&Jeeted to embargo or Halted exportation la this country*
f
ila© meertaln gasntity In the Itfalo-^thlopdaji conflict mas*
csrionsly onmig^L,

Althea^ tbs Bsnl state did nothing directly

either for the %m ^ m or for Italy, the

fear at Geneva that

Germany ladght profit from league action against Italy scorned to he the
most offootire d e t s m m t In Gaaom's fell m m of the %0 * & m tmchiixery
against mi aggressor nation*
Jtutssolini's
treated*.

Indirectly. therefore* Sltler played Into

Ijy keeping the attention of -the Geneva delegates die*

Indirectly* also. Geraariy did profit from the Ethiopian affair,

tseansc it Is a safe asffaraption that filtier’s remilli&rissatiati of the
Rhineland mould hare sailed forth more vigorous action from Frsne© and
Britain If it had not t e m for the weakened condition of the league re*
.salting from Italy's disregard of her treaty obligations*
fbe effect of the league's Ethiopian f&ilar© upon the system
of ©olXectlvo security ©alsodlod In the Geneva organisation samot he as*
snr&tely estimated, but 1* toowa to he great*

The most tescdiat© result

of the hreeMosn In collectiv© smchlnory appears to hare h e m Gcrssaay'*
hold, unilateral dcsiuFJeiatiori of lie treats" afeligntleas. an ©vent evidently
timed to coincide nilt the lack of solidarity, of unanimity. at Geneva*
Anothcr significant dcvaiopmsnt is the Indict ion that msa® of the power*
ful i m & m wm&mvm themselves are dv&lons ©oncoming the degree of pro*
tection which the Lea na eon offer* and are es^spleeientiisg the Geneva oiv
gmlsation with bilateral treaties* 'Fbm Franco-Soviet fact and the
Anglo-Geroim Baval $MKty* Beth concluded In the period of the Ethiopian
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